Policy Memos | Аналитические записки

Policy Memo # 600
Mikhail Alexseev 20 Jun 2019
(PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo) Numerous academic studies have shown that economic hardship, ethnoregional divides, corrupt governance, and war are bad for democracy, particularly in states where democracy has weak historical roots. By those yardsticks, one might expect public support for democracy in Ukraine to plummet four years after the Euromaidan revolution and the onset of the Donbas war. Yet this has not been the case. Why? Drawing on mass...
Policy Memo # 599
Pavel Baev 20 Jun 2019
(PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo) The Caucasus remained strikingly stable for a whole decade after the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008. Neither the explosion of turmoil in the Arab world from 2011 nor the escalation of the Syrian war from 2015 reverberated deeply in this region. The April 2018 revolution in Armenia, however, delivered a shock that can alter this regional stability. A year and a half into the evolution of this revolution, its...
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Policy Memo # 598
Jason Strakes 12 Jun 2019
(PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo) As one of the most intractable and tendentious issues in post-Soviet affairs, the enduring rivalry between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh/Artsakh subregion presents scholars of international relations with a certain challenge. It is widely recognized that the United States, Russia, and France—the current co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group—have been unsuccessful in either imposing a settlement or convincing...
Policy Memo # 597
Sergei Medvedev 30 May 2019
(PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo) Over the past decade, one of the key aspects of Russian politics has been the increased interference of the state in the private lives of the population. All sorts of controls have been applied about sexuality, reproduction, retirement, eating and drinking, hygiene, smoking, using obscene words, using the Internet, U.S. adoptions of Russian orphans, and sharing information about homosexuality. The various streams of...
Policy Memo # 596
Ivan Kurilla 28 May 2019
(PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo) Relations between Russia and the United States have been known to change, for the better or for the worse, within a relatively short period of time. Drawing on historical examples, I analyze cases when relations improved and speculate about the applicability of past times on today’s political environment. This policy memo is the sequel to my April 2018 policy memo, “The Anti-Russia Surge in U.S. Politics: Finding Context...
Policy Memo # 595
Harley Balzer 24 May 2019
(PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo) Recent survey and focus group data indicate that Russians increasingly are questioning whether some of President Vladimir Putin’s policies are worth the price in terms of threats to global peace and damage to Russia’s economy. Rapid fluctuations in Russian public opinion suggest that some Kremlin projects and potential foreign initiatives, perhaps another “short victorious war,” could undermine rather than enhance the...
Policy Memo # 594
Richard Arnold 20 May 2019
(PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo) The violent anti-immigrant events in March 2019 in the Russian autonomous republic of Sakha (Yakutia) may foreshadow rising interethnic hostility and an inward turn connected to a crisis of legitimacy for President Vladimir Putin’s regime. While critics have argued that far-right violence is a somewhat contrived feature of Putin’s “managed democracy,” it also reflects genuine social problems in the country. Following the...
Policy Memo # 593
Emmanuel Dreyfus 13 May 2019
(PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo) At first glance, Ukraine’s recent presidential election further confirmed the dramatic decrease of Russian influence in Ukraine. Not a single candidate based his or her campaign on the promotion of an open rapprochement with Russia and neither of the two candidates labeled as “pro-Russian” reached the second round. Still, the election illustrated the decline of the “pro- vs. anti-Russian” divide that has shaped Ukrainian...
Policy Memo # 592
(PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo) The days of political promise the Russian liberal opposition enjoyed during 2011-12 when the “angry urbanites” protested against the regime, are long over. The Russian “progressive era” failed without even starting. Instead, the Kremlin undertook a conservative turn promoting the type of identity politics that enabled it to generate popular support for the country’s political leadership. The new, morality-driven identity...
Policy Memo # 591
Andrey Makarychev 01 May 2019
(PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo) Various Russian opposition groups operate outside of Russia articulating and promoting a normative type of political discourse grounded in values of freedom, democracy, and rule of law. These are entities established by Russian oppositional figures and organizations such as the Open Russia Foundation, Boris Nemtsov Foundation for Freedom, and the Free Russia Forum. They form patchworks and networks of individual strategies and...

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