Policy Memos | Аналитические записки

Policy Memo # 70
Celeste A. Wallander 01 Oct 1999
Other than coining of clever titles and claiming something new, is there any value to asking whether Russian-US relations are entering a post-post-Cold War world? I think so, because we have to understand that we have a different Russia in 1999 and the legacy of nearly a decade of relations, with both positive and very negative effects. Furthermore, it is important to understand what was right in Western policy, what was wrong, and why. This enables us to...
Policy Memo # 69
Michael McFaul 01 Oct 1999
According to conventional wisdom, the United States "lost" Russia in the 1990s. This assessment can be found on the pages of The Nation, The Washington Times, The New York Times magazine, or foreign policy issue papers prepared for presidential candidate George W. Bush. These attacks fall into two contradictory categories. One school holds that the policies pursued by the United States over the last decade have failed to establish capitalism and...
Policy Memo # 68
Douglas Blum 01 Oct 1999
This memo deals with globalization and its implications for US policy toward Russia. Accordingly, the first order of business is a brief working definition. As used here globalization has three major components: 1) openness (political-institutional and infrastructural); 2) flows (of capital, people, goods, information and ideas); and 3) convergence (or homogenization) in terms of technical harmonization, social organization, popular culture, and norms (...
Policy Memo # 66
Vadim Radaev 01 Aug 1999
There is much speculation that Russian business is coming through an age of "wild market" with no well-established rules and conventions shared by entrepreneurs today. In this memo I consider the spread of violence in Russian business and specific relationships of business protection from an empirical viewpoint. I use data collected for two main 1997-1998 surveys: a standardized survey of 227 entrepreneurs and managers from 21 regions of Russia...
Policy Memo # 65
Eva Busza 01 Jun 1999
The Russian military's attempt to shape the Kosovo peace settlement through its move into Pristina should not have come as such a shock to Western diplomats. It is only the most recent example of a disturbing and pervasive trend in Russia: the civilian leadership's inability to control and govern its increasingly weak, fragmented and frustrated military. This action took the West by surprise because policymakers have grown to expect passivity...
Tags:Russia
Policy Memo # 64
Eduard Ponarin 01 Jun 1999
Western policymakers and their scholarly advisers seem to focus primarily on the oligarchical interests of the Russian elite rather than on long-range societal processes. This memo is an attempt to assess the potential of ideational sources of Russian interests from a broader sociological perspective. It is important to understand that the search for a Russian national identity is not merely driven by cynical elites, but arises from a genuine need within...
Policy Memo # 63
Brian Taylor 01 Jun 1999
The war in Kosovo may be the final nail in the coffin for the sputtering US-Russia bilateral arms control process. Deep cuts in nuclear weapons, an anticipated dividend of the end of the Cold War, have been on hold for years while the START II Treaty languishes in the Russian Duma. Both countries continue to deploy more than 6,000 strategic nuclear warheads. With Russian parliamentary and presidential elections set for December 1999 and June 2000,...
Policy Memo # 62
Celeste A. Wallander 01 May 1999
  On the 6th of May five members of the Program on New Approaches to Russian Security (PONARS) discussed Russian views on Kosovo for a panel at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. The panel was co-sponsored by PONARS, the Strengthening Democrat Institutions Project, and the Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and Public Policy. Marvin Kalb of the Shorenstein Center chaired the session, which began...
Policy Memo # 61
The Russian military is gaining influence within Russia as a result of NATO involvement in Kosovo. The crisis is providing a pretext for the military to increase its leverage over politicians and successfully lobby for what it wants. If the Kosovo crisis is short-lived, Russia will return to "politics as usual." The longer the war drags on, however, the greater will be the military's leverage, particularly since Russia is...

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