Policy Memos | Аналитические записки

Policy Memo # 182
Russia’s Belarus dilemma can be formulated as two questions. Should Moscow continue the process of political integration with Belarus--which necessarily entails interaction with and support of the regime of President Aleksandr Lukashenko--in order to enjoy certain geopolitical, security and economic dividends? Or, should Moscow gradually give up the current bilateral “special relationship,” which depletes Russia’s financial...
Policy Memo # 181
In the summer of 2000, a long-simmering conflict within the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) burst into the open in a series of leaks to the media that culminated in a stormy meeting of the Collegium of the Ministry of Defense (an assembly of the top brass) on July 12. The center of contention was a proposal by the General Staff, under the leadership of its chief, Anatoly Kvashnin, for a dramatic shift of emphasis away from nuclear weapons toward...
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Policy Memo # 180
When President Vladimir Putin said that Russia is ready to work together with the United States on building a missile defense system, it was quite a surprise, to say the least. The proposal, made in Putin's interview to NBC, appeared a few days before the June 2000 US-Russian summit, the expectations for which were very low, primarily because of the US intent to proceed with its missile defense program. So,  when Putin said that Russia would not...
Policy Memo # 179
Alexander Pikayev 01 Nov 2000
Shortly after coming into power, Russian President Vladimir Putin's administration significantly changed Moscow's foreign and security priorities. These changes were based upon the realization that the real and present danger to the country's security comes from the low-intensity conflicts emerging along Russia's vulnerable underbelly, which stretches from the Black Sea to the Pamir Mountains. While Russia's relations with more...
Policy Memo # 178
Vladimir Orlov 01 Nov 2000
Russia has not figured in the US presidential campaign for a number of obvious reasons. When Russian policy was touched upon--and nearly transformed into a scandal against one of the candidates--it was in reference to Russian-Iranian cooperation in sensitive areas, including advanced conventional weapons and the nuclear sphere. Thus, it turns out that Russia's relations with states of concern (Iran, North Korea, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Cuba) are still...
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Policy Memo # 177
Bear Braumoeller 01 Nov 2000
Debates regarding American implementation of a national missile defense (NMD) and theater missile defense (TMD) systems designed to shoot down incoming nuclear missiles have so far focused on such issues as technical feasibility, cost, and the likely Russian reaction (for background bearing on the latter question see PONARS memos 108, 109, 132, and 134). It has largely been taken for granted that, if these obstacles could be overcome, implementation would...
Policy Memo # 176
The abysmal state of Russia's conventional forces has caused Moscow to rely on nuclear weapons to ensure its security. This reliance was formalized in Russia's military doctrine, which states that nuclear weapons can be used "in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation and its allies." In fact, most Russian security analysts believe that this dependence on nuclear weapons will continue for the foreseeable...
Policy Memo # 175
David Woodruff 01 Nov 2000
The gloom that followed the August 1998 financial crisis has given way, in some circles, to euphoria. In the first half of 2000, the Russian economy grew by 7.5% compared to the same period in 1999. This excellent economic performance, most agree, is based on two factors: high oil prices and a weak exchange rate. High oil prices have been a bonanza for Russian energy exporters, which have enjoyed tremendous sales growth. Taxes collected on burgeoning oil...
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Policy Memo # 174
Although the August 1998 currency crisis came as a surprise to at least some observers, the rapid recovery of the Russian economy after the crisis was even more unexpected. Unlike the experience of East Asian countries, Russia’s economy enjoyed a boom after the currency crisis, not a recession. Output started to grow immediately after the crisis in October 1998, and continues to increase at a high rate for over two years now. In fact, gross domestic...
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Policy Memo # 173
When the Soviet Union broke apart nine years ago, Western observers voiced dire predictions about Russia's fate. Some warned that a quasi-fascist or military dictatorship would seize power; others spoke ominously about the violent disintegration of the country along the lines of Yugoslavia. Many expressed particular misgivings about the dangers posed by Russia's nuclear arsenal, which, they feared, would be vulnerable to diversion and "...

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