Policy Memos | Аналитические записки

Policy Memo # 285
In just over five years, Vladimir Putin will be constitutionally obliged to step down as Russia’s president. Although Putin’s popularity rating remains in the 70–85 percent range, and his reelection to a second term in 2004 seems almost assured, the nature of the post-Putin succession is still hard to foresee. This memo argues that given the continuing absence in Russia of reliable institutional mechanisms to ensure a peaceful transfer...
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Policy Memo # 284
Vladimir Putin's KGB past, strong state rhetoric, and specific policy decisions (Chechnya, the attacks on media oligarchs Boris Berezovskii and Vladimir Gusinskii, etc.) have heightened fears of the return to a police state in Russia. The creation of seven federal districts in May 2000, five of which were headed by police and military generals, seemed to provide further evidence of this authoritarian drift. Two and one half years later, we can now...
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Policy Memo # 283
Kathryn Stoner-Weiss 01 Oct 2002
Almost immediately after his May 2000 inauguration, President Putin moved swiftly to address the epidemic of regional resistance to central authority in the latter 1990s. Vowing to reestablish and reassert the strength of the Russian state, and the vertical chain of authority from center to periphery in particular, he launched a multi-front war on regional resistance to Moscow. First, he established seven federal districts within his presidential...
Policy Memo # 282
Despite two and one-half years of federal reform under Russian president Vladimir Putin, there is still no clear understanding of just what this federal reform is supposed to achieve. The scope, impetus, and intended outcome of the reform project can still be analyzed from many different angles. This memo argues Russia’s power ministries or power structures are a source and driving force of reform, with their restructuring being one of the major...
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Policy Memo # 281
For a brief while after the collapse of the August 1991 coup in Moscow, speculation abounded that the Soviet state security apparatus, known since 1954 as the KGB, would be dissolved. This speculation proved unfounded. Although the KGB in late 1991 was divided into a number of separate agencies―one for internal security, one for foreign intelligence, and one for border control, along with a few specialized units (e.g., a bodyguard service and a...
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Policy Memo # 280
Oleg Kharkhordin 01 Oct 2002
Why do so many studies of political culture in Russia tend to produce boring, familiar accounts that describe the essential ambiguity of Russia's progress toward democracy and the market economy? The everyday moral intuitions shared by the majority of Russians are rooted in the ethics of virtue, rather than the ethics of principle. Hence a search for values, which allegedly underlie actions that conform to these principles, misses the point. Perhaps,...
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Policy Memo # 279
Shaken to the core by the September 11 attacks, the United States naturally took the leading role in the global fight against terrorism. By demonstrating that even unprecedented military might does not guarantee strategic invulnerability, the September 11 tragedy had far-reaching implications for serious changes in U.S. domestic and foreign policy. The U.S. national security policy has been reviewed: anti-terrorism and homeland defense have assumed...
Policy Memo # 278
Ratification of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT, or the Moscow Treaty), signed by Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush on May 24, 2002, is all but certain. Critics in both capitals have apparently been proven wrong—it turned out to be possible to break with three decades of arms control experience and traditions and to sign a treaty that almost completely lacks substantive provisions; even those that are included into the treaty cannot...
Policy Memo # 277
Russia has always considered arms control negotiations with the United States to be one of the most important elements of its foreign policy. Debates about strategic arms reductions and the future of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty have played a significant role in the U.S.-Russian relationship during the past decade. The importance of arms control is further underscored by the fact that Russian society and leadership traditionally pay serious...
Policy Memo # 276
Alexander Pikayev 01 Oct 2002
The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT, or the Treaty of Moscow) signed by U.S. president George W. Bush and Russian president Vladimir Putin during their Moscow/St. Petersburg summit in May 2002, marks the de facto end of traditional U.S.-Russian negotiated strategic arms control. In sharp contrast to previous agreements, the Moscow Treaty is very short (only three pages long) and it does not contain any definitions of what exactly should be...

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