Policy Memos | Аналитические записки

Policy Memo # 88
Bulava, a solid-propellant submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), has been developed as part of a new-generation system for the naval component of Russia’s strategic nuclear triad. The Bulava’s deployment onboard the Yuri Dolgoruki, a Borei-class strategic submarine newly designed to carry the missile, has been anticipated for over two years. However, an uneven record of test launches, including its most recent failures in December 2008...
Policy Memo # 87
On July 24, 2009, Turkmen president Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov convened a special session of the government to discuss issues related to ownership of the Caspian oil and gas fields. At the meeting, Deputy Foreign Minister Toyly Komekov discussed the results of recent talks with Azerbaijan on dividing the Caspian Sea: despite Turkmenistan’s efforts to reach an agreement, no consensus could be achieved. Berdimuhamedov underlined that Azerbaijan has...
Policy Memo # 86
On December 12, 2008, a group of Turkish intellectuals launched an internet campaign to apologize for the World War I-era slaughter of Armenians in Turkey. Significantly, the “apology campaign” did not employ the highly disputed term “genocide” (soykırım), opting instead for a Turkish translation of the term commonly used in the Armenian language, the “Great Catastrophe” (Meds Yeghern or, in Turkish, Büyük Felaket)....
Policy Memo # 85
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), comprising China, Russia, and four of the five Central Asian states (excluding Turkmenistan), continues to be a source of fascination and speculation. Western commentators remain divided over the organization’s exact purpose, scope and potential relationship with the West. While some have dismissed the SCO as a “paper tiger,” others have urged transatlantic policymakers to take immediate steps...
Policy Memo # 84
Russia’s 2009 gas cutoff to Ukraine and the European Union and subsequent efforts to establish control over the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) reignited concerns about a “re-energized” Russian foreign policy across Eurasia. Similarly, the July 2009 intergovernmental agreement on the construction of the Nabucco gas pipeline, a project mired in controversy over sources of throughput and financing, continues to fuel anxiety in Moscow...
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Policy Memo # 83
In May 2009, Russia’s National Security Strategy discussed energy for the first time, outlining the country’s opportunities and challenges in the international energy market within the framework of broader security issues. Russia’s opportunities include further development of sales to the European market, opening the Asian market, and using the profits from energy sales to develop a more diversified domestic economy, one that is no...
Policy Memo # 82
Russia was hit hard by the drop in oil prices in the second half of 2008 and also by the financial turmoil that has since spread around the world. While in 2008 the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimated the growth of Russia‘s gross domestic product to be 5.6 percent, it predicts a decline of 6.8 percent for 2009. The rebound in oil prices in the first half of 2009 has mitigated some of Russia’s problems, as has...
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Policy Memo # 81
It is widely accepted that the stability of Russia’s political regime and Vladimir Putin’s high approval ratings, first as president and then prime minister, have depended mainly upon a steady increase in Russians’ real incomes. Between 2000 and 2007, Russia’s gross domestic product grew 72 percent, while real incomes grew 141 percent. Combined with the accessibility of cheap credit, rising incomes produced a consumption boom....
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Policy Memo # 80
Two years ago, when evaluating the hybrid regime of “over-managed democracy” (OMD) that Vladimir Putin constructed during his two presidential terms, I concluded that this regime was transitory; it had to develop toward either democracy or authoritarianism. Since then, Russia’s OMD has survived not only a presidential succession, but a year of economic crisis that has exacerbated the system’s shortcomings. Its survival raises the...
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Policy Memo # 79
In 1992, Russia’s new leadership, led by Boris Yeltsin, explicitly committed to making Russia part of the Western hegemonic system. By the following year, and for the decade after, Russia under President Yeltsin and, from 2000, under Vladimir Putin increasingly identified itself in opposition to U.S. hegemony, but remained agreeable to participation in some kind of multipolar collective hegemony led by the West. Since 2003, however, a “new...
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