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For many years, the prospect of regional integration in Central Asia was seen as a mirage—an attractive idea that had repeatedly failed to materialize. The regional strategies of the five states were widely perceived as static, peripheral, and largely reactive to external pressures. Over the last decade, however, Central Asia’s evolving political and economic trajectory has disrupted this dismissive narrative, revealing that the states’ policy approaches are neither linear nor uniform, but increasingly adaptive, contested, and shaped by national priorities and redefining regional dynamics.
Competing theories illuminate different parts of the story. Neofunctionalists (Haas, Schmitter) highlight economic interdependence and supranational logics; realists and neorealists (Walt, Grieco) see such cooperation as a function of power distribution and security concerns; Huntington’s civilizational lens links regionalization to identity and historical legacy; constructivists (Acharya, Adler) emphasize how shared norms, along with regional consciousness, are socially constructed; and proponents of “new regionalism” (Hettne, Söderbaum, Breslin) underscore post–Cold War, multi-actor, multidimensional patterns shaped by global structural transformations. Institutionalists (Keohane, Caporaso, Thelen, and Pierson) explain how regional frameworks reduce transaction costs, enhance trust, and evolve through path-dependent junctures.
Across these perspectives is a shared insight: Regionalism emerges from the interplay between internal drivers and external influences. That is especially relevant in Central Asia, where geography, regime type, natural resource endowment, and security dilemmas interact with shifting great-power politics and growing local agency.
Historical Context
Late Soviet policy, i.e., under Brezhnev and Gorbachev, inadvertently laid the foundations for interdependence among the Central Asian states as energy, water management, and transport networks were established in the republics that helped institutionalize patterns of regional cooperation.
Following the Soviet collapse in 1991, nation-building, economic stabilization, and state consolidation took precedence. Borders hardened, identity projects deepened, and regional cooperation largely receded. This phase was marked by “shallow integration”: top-down projects led by the “old elites,” limited participation from society, and narrow, defensive coordination focused on border security and regime survival. Regional cooperation depended heavily on political leaders—and when leadership changed or relationships soured, so did regional projects.
Still, there was limited progress. The creation of the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone and the launch of Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) were meaningful steps, for example. However, in the 2000s, as Russia reasserted itself, independent regional projects were absorbed or shelved. Moscow’s accession to the CACO in 2004, along with its subsequent merger into the Eurasian Economic Community, neutralized what had been a promising regional platform.
Participation in Russian-led formats (e.g., Commonwealth of Independent States, Collective Security Treaty Organization, Eurasian Economic Union) remained uneven and inward-looking, with protectionism, weak institutions, and low interregional trade. The divergent and often hesitant responses of Central Asia to Moscow’s initiatives revealed not only the shortcomings of externally imposed regionalism but also the structural limitations of the classical integration model. Rivalries—especially that between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan—further constrained outcomes.
Commodity Prices and New Political Leaders Drive a Shift in Central Asia
In the 1990s, the negative effects of a depressed commodity market, particularly the slump of oil and natural gas prices, were stark. These hardships highlighted the vulnerabilities of isolated national economies. However, the commodity boom from 2000 to 2014, briefly disrupted by the global financial crisis, had a paradoxical impact: While windfall earnings strengthened state capacity and fostered economic growth, they also diminished the perceived urgency for integration. Resource-rich states such as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan increasingly pursued independent development strategies while resource-poor countries like Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan struggled to keep afloat. This growing disparity deepened economic and political divides, further complicating efforts to foster collective action and build a cohesive regional framework.
This pattern began to change with the sharp decline in the oil market in 2014. In retrospect, it appears that moderate commodity prices—neither excessively high nor critically low—create the most favorable conditions for meaningful and increasingly homegrown regionalization. In Central Asia, the first signs of this new regional reality began to emerge in 2017, catalyzed by the leadership transitions in Uzbekistan and, later, in Kazakhstan—developments that were accompanied by a marked improvement in relations between the Central Asian states.
Under new leadership, Uzbekistan adopted a more outward-looking and cooperative stance, which has helped unlock regional potential that had long been constrained by mutual suspicion and isolationist policies. The region has gradually moved beyond the classical, hegemony-centric model of integration toward a more pragmatic, flexible, and inclusive one, which is increasingly consistent with the principles of “new regionalism.” The impact of this evolution is evident at all levels (see Figure 1).
Economic cooperation, improved connectivity, and infrastructure development have become the visible part of Central Asia’s common agenda, reflecting the region’s growing interdependence. This has been supported by projects like China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Additionally, shared challenges, such as water security and climate change, have further encouraged collaboration.
New formats of regional dialogue have emerged, helping to get everyone on the same page. Since 2018, regular consultative summits have institutionalized flexible, leader-level coordination. The 2024 Astana summit adopted a roadmap on the development of regional cooperation for 2025-2027 and a Central Asia 2040 development concept, documents signaling shared long-term intent.
Public opinion has moved, too: Surveys indicate a growing sense of regional identity, with over 70 percent of respondents in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan expressing positive views toward deeper links. The pace of progress remains inconsistent, yet Astana and Tashkent have emerged as genuine engines of regional cooperation.
The multilateral, C5+1 format has amplified the Central Asians’ diplomatic power. The Central Asian states now collectively engage with the United States, the European Union, Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, South Korea, China, Russia, the Gulf states, India, the Nordic states, and international organizations (the UN and OSCE) in structured dialogues that reinforce autonomy and diversify options.
Leadership Hegemonic, elite-driven Collaborative, multilevel, reform-oriented
Institutions Formal treaties, rigid bodies Soft structures (informal, summit-based forums, MOUs)
Trade policy Inward-looking, protectionist Outward, development-focused
Integration path Sovereignty-centered, focusing on nation-building and state independence, under Russia-dominated regional security Infrastructure, economic diversification, pragmatic multilateralism with emergence of regional identity
Figure 1. Snapshot of classical versus new regionalism in Central Asia
Source: Author
New Regionalism and the Post-Hegemonic Order
The reshaping of international power relations has further expanded opportunities for Central Asian states to maneuver. As globalization loses steam and the international system becomes more fragmented and multipolar, momentum behind regionalism continues to grow. Meanwhile, Russia’s war against Ukraine has catalyzed a rebalancing, with a true change in who calls the economic shots. China’s rise as the region’s top economic partner—thanks in large part to the BRI—has been decisive. As of 2024, China-Central Asia trade ($94 billion) more than doubled Russia-Central Asia trade ($45 billion), while Chinese investment ($66 billion) far exceeded capital coming from Russia ($23.9 billion).
Beijing has prioritized infrastructure development designed to strategically connect China with European markets, often by deliberately bypassing Russian territory to reduce dependence and assert greater control over trade flows. Projects such as the China/Kyrgyzstan/Uzbekistan railway and trans-Caspian transport routes lock Central Asia into China-centric production and logistics networks, while loans and concessions, especially in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, have increased Beijing’s leverage. As Moscow faces mounting economic and geopolitical constraints, China’s infrastructure-led approach is quietly redrawing the map of influence in Central Asia.
The Middle Kingdom’s expanding role is institutional and commercial: BRI, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the China-Central Asia Business Council, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank provide financing, rules, and a platform for coordination. Attempts to harmonize these with Russian-led structures have been superficial; as Moscow’s economic, cultural, and security presence has receded, Beijing has filled the space. The second C5+China summit (in Astana in June 2025) announced initiatives to support trade, green mining (of rare earths), anti-desertification, scholarships, and language programs, codified in the Astana Declaration and the Treaty on Eternal Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation. The latter commits the sides to mutual support and nonalignment in relation to each other (another sign of post-hegemonic rebalancing).
Concurrently, the West’s engagement with the region has changed, as well: The U.S. policy of restraint and gradual disengagement, culminating in the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan, has been accompanied by an expanding European footprint across the region. The EU has recognized the geopolitical and economic value of the Trans-Caspian International Trade Route (TITR), also known as the Middle Corridor. Against the backdrop of rising tensions with Russia, Brussels has deepened its support for this alternative east-west trade and transit channel. It offers a more resilient and diversified supply chain architecture, reducing exposure to Russian-controlled transit networks and reinforcing the EU’s broader connectivity strategy with Central Asia and China. Even without full operationalization of TITR, Europe as a whole has become a major strategic and economic player in the region. In 2024, the EU made up 22.6 percent of Central Asia’s total foreign trade, at EUR 56 billion, which puts it in second place after China. The EU also remains one of the region’s biggest investors, with major funding going into sectors like water, energy, and climate projects, digital infrastructure, transport, and critical raw materials. With the recent U.S. tariffs hitting the Central Asian economies, the EU is increasingly viewed in the region as the more stable and more attractive Western partner. Indeed, engagement with Europe is critical for Central Asia. That impression was only reinforced at the C5+EU summit in Samarkand in April. What remains to be seen is whether the EU can complement its economic role with more active security support. This challenge is underscored by ongoing, direct transnational security risks stemming from Central Asia, such as drug trafficking, money laundering, and potential WMD proliferation and terrorism.
Overall, the shifting balance of power is nudging Central Asia toward a new phase of integration, best described as post-hegemonic regionalism. No single state, internally or externally, dominates the region: Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan remain influential but not supreme; meanwhile, Russia, China, the EU, the United States, Turkey, India, and the Gulf states all matter but lack overriding control. This emerging order is characterized by power diffusion and pragmatic cooperation. The focus is increasingly practical, centered on areas such as water management, energy, transport connectivity, and climate adaptation. These issue-specific priorities are reshaping integration around shared interests rather than geopolitical alignment. Still, fragility persists: Hedging is rational, institutions thin, and state capacities vary, while unresolved border and water disputes, as well as structural asymmetries, could stress the current model and test its durability.
Middle Powers or International Swing States?
As strategic rivalry intensifies across Eurasia, leaders in Central Asia increasingly talk about becoming middle powers. Some features are present—agenda-setting on connectivity and energy transit; greater diplomatic confidence; multi-vector ties. But other, classic middle-power features (global norm entrepreneurship, robust multilateral leadership, resilient democratic institutions, broad soft power) remain lacking.
A better descriptor is “emerging swing states” (see Figure 2). They are strategically flexible actors that shift their alignment to maximize autonomy and advantage, akin to India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Vietnam. Central Asian states calibrate between the West, China, and Russia, with decisions and events in these interactions capable of tipping bigger, global competitions (e.g., U.S.-China, EU-Russia). The Central Asians’ behavior is interest-based, focused on regime security, partner diversification, and gaining leverage. It is not value oriented in the OECD sense. Their leaders’ willingness to engage on multiple fronts without becoming ideologically attached to any single geopolitical camp positions these hedging states as pragmatic swing actors within an increasingly fragmented international system.
Figure 2. Key differences between middle powers and international swing states
Source: Author
Regionalism Without a Hegemon: The Energy Transition in Central Asia
The region’s economic model is still carbon-heavy, including large-scale fossil-fuel production in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, gas-based energy and manufacturing in Uzbekistan, and seasonal reliance on coal and diesel in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Methane leakage, inefficient grids, and water tensions make things worse. Hydrocarbons provide revenue and bargaining power for the states in the region, but also bring exposure to price swings, emissions scrutiny, and climate-related trade complications.
A just and orderly energy transition requires national reform plus regional cooperation, namely, scaling renewables, modernizing grids, cutting emissions (especially methane), and strengthening institutions. Central Asia’s emerging flexible regionalism fits this agenda: Climate and water are inherently not zero sum; local benefits from cooperation are tangible; and no external hegemon dictates outcomes. Overall, the energy transition reduces the appeal of hegemonic models.
Progress has been real but uneven. Uzbekistan’s green-energy share has climbed toward a fifth thanks to rapid green capacity additions, though fossil fuels still dominate. Kazakhstan has doubled its renewable-energy share since 2020 to over 6 percent (and 15 percent low-carbon overall), still well below global averages. The opportunity is to turn decarbonization into a platform for integration, meaning common grid codes, coordinated balancing markets, cross-border power purchase agreements, and joint investments that link East/West power flows and eventually green hydrogen corridors.
External frameworks are catalyzing this pivot. China’s “Green Silk Road” reframes BRI as promoting low-carbon connectivity. The EU’s Green Deal and the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism create price signals that reward cleaner production. International financial institutions (e.g., the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Asian Development Bank, Climate Investment Funds, World Bank) are aligning climate finance with regional platforms, while the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and Economic Commission for Europe back programs to improve water management for agriculture amid climate change. The International Energy Agency and Asian Development Bank in particular see scope for Central Asia as a renewable corridor connecting suppliers and consumers across Eurasia.
Policy momentum has been growing: The 2022 Fourth Consultative Summit of the Central Asian leaders cited climate cooperation as a priority; in 2023, the Regional Climate Change Adaptation Strategy for Central Asia established joint action planning, harmonized standards, data sharing, and sectoral methodologies. National plans, such as Kazakhstan’s 2060 carbon-neutrality strategy and Uzbekistan’s 2030 green economy vision, are converging.
To move the green agenda forward in Central Asia, a few practical steps could make a big difference: adopt common green standards and export certification; develop regional carbon markets and pooled climate-finance vehicles; align supply chains with ESG benchmarks; and set up a Central Asian development bank focused on green infrastructure, sustainable connectivity, and clean energy. Its job would be to complement, not duplicate, global institutions, and to anchor a homegrown transition.
The integration logic in Central Asia is changing. Rather than bloc politics, the region is experimenting with functional governance at the scale where benefits are greatest and risks are lowest. Confidence-building, results-based verification of reforms, interoperable standards, and cross-border projects are the practical building blocks of a post-hegemonic regionalism fit for the post-carbon era.
Conclusion
Is Central Asia regionalism different today? Yes, measurably so. It has progressed from shallow, elite-driven, externally constrained schemes to a more flexible, leader-anchored but increasingly multi-actor process that privileges practical cooperation. The external backdrop is shifting as China steps in as the primary economic partner, Russia’s role is diminished, the EU is more deeply engaged, and the United States pursues targeted involvement. The five Central Asian states, meanwhile, look less like would-be middle powers and more like strategic swing states, with leverage rooted in their geography—growing trade corridors between East and West run through them—their choice of economic standards (EU-style or China- or Russia-centric), and their security architecture.
The post-carbon agenda gives this regionalism further purpose. Decarbonization is not just an environmental imperative; it is also an opportunity to rewire economies, reduce vulnerabilities, and embed cooperation. Success will depend on sustaining political will, strengthening institutions with an eye toward effective delivery of tangible results, and resisting new forms of dependence, including nuclear lock-in, debt, and one-way transport routes. If Central Asian leaders can align national interests with joint action— especially on water, energy, transport, and climate resilience—–the region will move from the periphery of Eurasian politics to become an oasis of stability and connectivity in a turbulent world.
Vadim Grishin is a professorial lecturer of international affairs at George Washington University and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University.
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