PONARS Eurasia
  • About Us
    • Contact Us!
    • Membership
      • All Members
      • Core Members
      • Collegium Members
      • Associate Members
      • About Membership
    • Our Ukraine Experts
    • Executive Committee
  • Our Ukraine Experts
  • Policy Memos
    • List of Policy Memos
    • PONARS Eurasia’s Newest eBooks
    • Submissions
  • Online Academy
  • Events
    • Past Events
  • Recommended
  • Task Forces
    • Ukraine
      • PONARS Ukraine Task Force: Incontrovertible Truths
    • Amplifying Voices of Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia (AVECCA)
    • Russia in a Changing Climate
  • Podcasts
Contacts

Address
1957 E St NW,
Washington, DC 20052

[email protected]
202.994.5915

NEWSLETTER
Facebook
Twitter
YouTube
Podcast
PONARS Eurasia
PONARS Eurasia
  • About Us
    • Contact Us!
    • Membership
      • All Members
      • Core Members
      • Collegium Members
      • Associate Members
      • About Membership
    • Our Ukraine Experts
    • Executive Committee
  • Our Ukraine Experts
  • Policy Memos
    • List of Policy Memos
    • PONARS Eurasia’s Newest eBooks
    • Submissions
  • Online Academy
  • Events
    • Past Events
  • Recommended
  • Task Forces
    • Ukraine
      • PONARS Ukraine Task Force: Incontrovertible Truths
    • Amplifying Voices of Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia (AVECCA)
    • Russia in a Changing Climate
  • Podcasts
DIGITAL RESOURCES
digital resources

Bookstore 📚

Knowledge Hub

Course Syllabi

Point & Counterpoint

Policy Perspectives

RECOMMENDED
  • The ‘Don’t Lose Lukashenko’ Approach: Kyiv’s (Non-) Strategic Ambiguity Toward the Belarusian Opposition

    View
  • Too Much, Too Late? The Impact of Secrecy on Efforts to Mediate an End to the Russia-Ukraine War

    View
  • A Deal with the Devil: Lukashenko Navigates Domestic and External Vulnerabilities in Managing Relations with Russia

    View
  • Peacemaking Russian Style: Negotiations as the Continuation of War by Other Means

    View
  • ‘DIY Warfare’: How Russia Crowdsources the Battlefield in Ukraine

    View
RSS PONARS Eurasia Podcast
  • The Putin-Xi Summit: What's New In Their Joint Communique ? February 23, 2022
    In this week’s PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman speaks with Russian China experts Vita Spivak and Alexander Gabuev about the February meeting between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, and what it may tell us about where the Russian-Chinese relationship is headed.
  • Exploring the Russian Courts' Ruling to Liquidate the Memorial Society January 28, 2022
    In this week’s PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with scholars Kelly Smith and Benjamin Nathans about the history, achievements, and impending shutdown of the Memorial Society, Russia's oldest and most venerable civic organization, and what its imminent liquidation portends for the Russian civil society.
  • Russia's 2021 census and the Kremlin's nationalities policy [Lipman Series 2021] December 9, 2021
    In this week’s PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with social scientist Andrey Shcherbak about the quality of the data collected in the recent population census and the goals of Vladimir Putin's government's nationalities policy
  • Active citizens of any kind are under threat [Lipman Series 2021] November 5, 2021
    In this week’s PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with Alexander Verkhovsky about the Kremlin's ever expanding toolkit against political and civic activists, journalists, and other dissidents.
  • Russia's Legislative Elections followup [Lipman Series 2021] October 4, 2021
    In this week’s PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with Tanya Lokot and Nikolay Petrov about the results of Russia’s legislative elections and about what comes next.
  • Why Is the Kremlin Nervous? [Lipman Series 2021] September 14, 2021
    In this week’s PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with Ben Noble and Nikolay Petrov about Russia’s September 17-19 legislative elections, repressive measures against electoral challengers, and whether to expect anything other than preordained results.
  • Vaccine Hesitancy in Russia, France, and the United States [Lipman Series 2021] August 31, 2021
    In this week's PONARS Eurasia Podcast episode, Maria Lipman chats with Denis Volkov, Naira Davlashyan, and Peter Slevin about why COVID-19 vaccination rates are still so low across the globe, comparing vaccine hesitant constituencies across Russia, France, and the United States.  
  • Is Russia Becoming More Soviet? [Lipman Series 2021] July 26, 2021
      In a new PONARS Eurasia Podcast episode, Maria Lipman chats with Maxim Trudolyubov about the current tightening of the Russian political sphere, asking whether or not it’s helpful to draw comparisons to the late Soviet period.
  • The Evolution of Russia's Political Regime [Lipman Series 2021] June 21, 2021
    In this week's episode of the PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with Grigory Golosov and Henry Hale about the evolution of Russia's political regime, and what to expect in the lead-up to September's Duma elections.
  • Volodymyr Zelensky: Year Two [Lipman Series 2021] May 24, 2021
    In this week's episode of the PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with Sergiy Kudelia and Georgiy Kasianov about Ukrainian President Zelensky's second year in office, and how he has handled the political turbulence of the past year.
  • Policy Memos | Аналитика
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

From Crisis to Catalyst: The Impact of Russia’s War on Moldova’s Domestic and Foreign Policies

  • May 29, 2024
  • Igor Zaharov and Carolina Bogatiuc

Image credit/license

POnars eurasia policy memo no. 893 (pdf)

The Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, marked a pivotal moment in European geopolitics, drawing widespread condemnation and reshaping the security, economic, and political landscape of the region. Moldova has found itself at the forefront of this crisis—indeed, it has been the second most affected country behind Ukraine itself.

While the war has forced Moldova to confront multiple challenges and crises, it has also served as a catalyst for profound changes in the country’s domestic and foreign policies. Facing the humanitarian, economic, security, and energy challenges posed by the invasion of Ukraine, Moldova transformed EU accession into an overarching national priority. The government has actively pursued the reforms required for EU accession and implemented all recommendations made, demonstrating a commitment to democratic principles, rule of law, and economic modernization. With support from the EU, Moldova has found a way to handle the influx of refugees, enhanced economic connectivity with the EU, managed the security situation around the separatist region of Transnistria, and diversified its energy sources away from Russia. The country has substantially improved its position on numerous democracy indices and is working diligently to prepare for the EU accession negotiations. Seen from Moldova, EU membership is understood not just as a strategic choice, but as a vital step toward securing the country’s future. The country is also keen to contribute to strengthening Europe as a whole.

Challenges Facing Moldova in the Wake of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

Since the Russian invasion, Moldova has confronted multiple crises that have tested its resilience and adaptability. First came the humanitarian crisis: Moldova was prepared to host 30,000 refugees but instead saw an influx of almost 1 million people, with around 100,000 refugees remaining in the country. This unexpected surge posed significant challenges in terms of providing adequate shelter, food, and healthcare. Accordingly, Chișinău declared a 60-day state of emergency and fully closed its airspace for nearly a month. The state of emergency, which was supposed to last 60 days, persisted until December 30, 2023, underscoring the profound repercussions of Russia’s incursion into Ukraine on Moldova.

Economically, the war has exacerbated existing challenges, impacting trade routes, inflating prices, and straining resources. Moldova’s economy, which is heavily reliant on agriculture and remittances, has faced severe disruptions. The year 2022 was particularly challenging: the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell by six percent, a stark indicator of the economic turmoil unleashed by the geopolitical tensions in the region. Inflation soared to an alarming 34 percent, dramatically increasing Moldovans’ cost of living and putting immense pressure on the national economy. Today, Moldova’s economic situation is showing signs of improvement, thanks to both domestic efforts and international assistance. While challenges remain, the economy is gradually recovering, with projections of three-percent GDP growth in 2024. 

In 2022, Moldova suffered its worst energy crisis since independence. Prior to the war, the country was almost entirely dependent on Russian energy. In 2022, however, Gazprom delivered less than half the amount of natural gas stipulated in the relevant supply contracts and instituted a four-fold price hike for gas supplies to Moldova, leading to a sharp spike in inflation. Compounding the problem, in early October, as a result of a mass bombing campaign carried out by Russia against Ukrainian civilian and energy infrastructure, Ukraine became unable to export electricity to Moldova. On October 24, this provoked an electricity deficit in the country. Some regions faced short-term blackouts and Moldova began importing electricity from Romania. Security concerns have also increased, with missiles violating Moldovan airspace and increased risks of illegal border crossings, arms and drug smuggling, and human trafficking.

Nor is Moldova only facing external challenges. Indeed, the country is grappling with domestic strife, much of which is linked to Russia’s influence through proxies. At the heart of these difficulties is a hybrid warfare strategy designed to destabilize and manipulate, featuring tactics that range from disinformation campaigns to cyber-attacks. This turmoil is linked in large part to the activities of fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor, who is currently evading justice in Israel. Shor has been involved in financing paid protests in Moldova with a view to undermining the government and its pro-European Union trajectory. Such events not only create a climate of fear and uncertainty that disrupts daily life, but also place undue strain on the country’s security services, diverting attention from other critical issues.

One common narrative pushed through such disinformation campaigns is that Moldova’s aspirations to EU integration and potentially NATO membership would lead to economic ruin, the loss of national sovereignty, and compulsory involvement in military conflicts. These narratives aim to instill fear and opposition to Western integration among the Moldovan public and ultimately derail Moldova’s pursuit of EU integration, keeping Moldova within Russia’s sphere of influence.

On February 9, 2023, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky said that Ukrainian intelligence had intercepted plans by Russian intelligence to overthrow the democratically elected government of Moldova and establish control over the country. The allegations were subsequently corroborated by Moldovan intelligence. On February 13, Moldovan President Maia Sandu said the authorities had confirmed the existence of such a plot and revealed the details thereof. She said the coup plan envisioned using saboteurs with military training dressed in civilian clothes to stage attacks (including on state buildings) and take hostages. The Moldovan government was to be overthrown and replaced with a puppet government. The plan allegedly involved an alliance between criminal groups and two exiled Moldovan oligarchs. On February 21, Prime Minister Dorin Recean declared that Russia had tried to bring the Chișinău airport under its control in order to bring in Russian and pro-Russian diversionists to overthrow the government. Eight months after the alleged coup, President Sandu said that the Wagner Group and its leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, had been directly involved in the coup plot.

Handling multiple crises simultaneously proved to be a daunting challenge. Yet amid these difficulties, Russia’s aggression demonstrated that EU integration is the sole path for Moldova. Moving toward EU integration is not merely a strategic choice but a vital step in solidifying the democratic advances Moldova has made since gaining independence. Moreover, it represents a commitment to fostering regional stability and security.

Navigating Turbulence: How Moldova Successfully Managed These Multiple Crises

Moldova’s response to these crises was multifaceted, demonstrating resilience and strategic realignment toward European integration. Diversification of energy sources was a key strategy, enabling Moldova to navigate its first winter (2022/2023) without Russian gas and electricity. International support and solidarity—both through the Moldova Support Platform, co-created by Germany, France and Romania, and otherwise—were crucial. Moldova addressed the humanitarian crisis by providing support to refugees, strengthened its cybersecurity to counter hybrid threats, and maintained stability in politically sensitive regions such as Gagauzia, as well as in the separatist region of Transnistria, which is internationally recognized as a part of Moldova. Economic and social measures were implemented to mitigate the economic impact of the crises, supported by international financial aid and investments in critical infrastructure to boost economic resilience.

These crises catalyzed Moldova’s EU integration process, transforming EU accession into an overarching national priority. Moldova’s support for Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression highlighted Chișinău’s alignment with European values and security interests. The government has actively pursued the reforms required for EU accession and implemented all recommendations made, demonstrating a commitment to democratic principles, rule of law, and economic modernization.

On June 23, 2022, against the backdrop of the war, both Moldova and Ukraine obtained candidate status. On December 14, 2023, the European Council decided to open accession talks with Moldova and Ukraine.

As a candidate country, Moldova has stepped up its contribution to a stronger Europe. The country successfully hosted the second European Political Community Summit; has continued strengthening security and defense cooperation with EU counterparts, especially through the European Peace Facility; and expedited the launch of the EU Partnership Mission (EUPM). Moldova’s growing contributions to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and United Nations (UN) missions underscore its commitment to global peace and security.

In 2023, Chișinău significantly increased its alignment with the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), reaching a cumulative alignment rate of 89.2 percent, up from 64.2 percent in 2022. This entailed aligning with 13 new EU sanctions regimes, such as the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime, and three specific sanctions regimes related to Russia’s actions in Crimea and Ukraine. The country has also adopted a new framework for international development aid. Moreover, Moldova’s dedication to regional cooperation and humanitarian support is exemplified by the provision of aid to Ukraine, the establishment of Solidarity Lanes, and the opening of new border crossings with Romania and Ukraine.

Upholding Peace While Bolstering Democracy

The government has maintained peace and stability in the country by carefully managing the situation around the separatist region of Transnistria, which has become part of Russia’s information war. In February 2024, as Moldova braced for a pivotal electoral year—featuring both the presidential election and a referendum on European integration slated for October—the separatist regime in Tiraspol convened the 7th “congress” of so-called “deputies of all levels.” Contrary to what was rumored in the international press, the final text of the resolution did not include a request for Russian President Vladimir Putin to annex Transnistria to Russia. However, the adopted document does contain “an appeal” to the State Duma and Federation Council of Russia, as well as such international organizations as the UN and OSCE, “to take diplomatic measures aimed at protection” of the Transnistrian region against “Moldova’s pressure.” Such requests for Russian aid are nothing new: In the last two years, the Tiraspol regime has appealed to the Kremlin at least three times. Moldova’s success in maintaining peace in the Transnistrian region showcases its commitment to a peaceful resolution.

Amid these challenges, Moldova has tackled the insecurity surrounding gas and electricity supplies, thereby ensuring the well-being of the country’s citizens. The country has been transforming its energy sector at great speed. In the last year, the country has moved away from its former complete reliance on Russian gas and now buys all gas needed for heating from other suppliers. Joint purchases of gas with EU countries, the synchronization of the country’s electricity networks with the EU, and work on new electricity connections to Romania are all making Moldova more resilient. The nation’s continued integration into the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E), significant gas reserves, and progress in the field of renewable energy highlight its commitment to a greener and more sustainable future.

In the economic sphere, Moldova has effectively addressed high inflation rates, which have now decreased to 5 percent (from 34 percent in 2022). The country has embarked on a transformative journey by participating in the EU internal market program, signing a new free trade agreement with the EFTA, signing an agreement on reducing roaming charges with the EU, enhancing connectivity, and promoting economic growth.

One of Moldova’s standout accomplishments in this period has been its significant improvements on democratic rankings. For instance, Moldova now ranks 28th out of 180 countries on the Reporters Without Borders (RSF) index, a remarkable improvement of 63 positions since 2020. Similarly, in the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, Moldova ranks 76th out of 180 countries, a notable improvement of 39 positions since 2020. Additionally, in the Global Gender Gap Report, Moldova currently occupies the 19th position out of 146 countries. These developments highlight Moldova’s unwavering dedication to upholding democratic principles and fostering transparency within its governance.

The most significant indicator of Chișinău’s ambition and commitment is its unwavering preparation for EU accession negotiations. The country has accelerated its efforts by establishing 35 working groups for each negotiation chapter, an effort that has involved over 600 civil servants. In October, the Government approved the National Action Plan for the Republic of Moldova’s Accession to the European Union for the years 2024-2027. The Bureau for European Integration was established within the State Chancellery of Moldova, led by a Deputy Prime Minister who is also the country’s chief negotiator for EU accession. Moldova has fulfilled eight of the nine recommendations of the European Commission and made significant progress on the remaining action. The country has now commenced the screening process and is diligently working to initiate formal negotiations through the first EU-Moldova Intergovernmental Conference, which is slated to take place by the end of June 2024.

Conclusion

In navigating the multifaceted domestic and international challenges posed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Moldova has demonstrated resilience and determination. While the conflict has underscored Moldova’s vulnerabilities and the complexities of its security landscape, it has also served as a catalyst for profound changes, pushing the nation toward deeper integration with Western democracies and reinforcing its commitment to EU accession. Moldova’s response to these crises reflects its unwavering dedication to democratic principles, economic modernization, and regional stability: EU membership is understood not just as a strategic choice, but as a vital step toward securing the country’s future. Keeping a close eye on Moldova’s political scene will be instructive, especially as the country gears up for two significant democratic events—the presidential elections and an EU integration referendum, both slated for the latter part of October—that will present Moldovans with the opportunity to clearly express their aspirations regarding EU membership. Meanwhile, Russia’s attempts to sway Moldova from this course underscore the critical need for vigilance among the Moldovan public and authorities alike.

Igor Zaharov served as communications adviser to former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Moldova Nicu Popescu.

Carolina Bogatiuc served as chief of staff to former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Moldova Nicu Popescu.

POnars eurasia policy memo no. 893 (pdf)

Image credit/license

Related Topics
  • Foreign Policy
  • Moldova
  • Russia
Previous Article
  • Policy Memos | Аналитика
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

Belarus and the War: Gradual De-Sovereignization of the Country

  • May 23, 2024
  • Ryhor Nizhnikau
View
Next Article
  • Policy Memos | Аналитика
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

Escaping Russia’s Death Grip: How Has Putin’s Aggression in Ukraine Affected Security in Armenia and Karabakh

  • May 29, 2024
  • Nona Shahnazarian
View
You May Also Like
View
  • Policy Memos | Аналитика
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

The ‘Don’t Lose Lukashenko’ Approach: Kyiv’s (Non-) Strategic Ambiguity Toward the Belarusian Opposition

  • Boris Ginzburg
  • February 23, 2026
View
  • Policy Memos | Аналитика
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

Too Much, Too Late? The Impact of Secrecy on Efforts to Mediate an End to the Russia-Ukraine War

  • Mikhail Troitskiy
  • February 23, 2026
View
  • Policy Memos | Аналитика
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

A Deal with the Devil: Lukashenko Navigates Domestic and External Vulnerabilities in Managing Relations with Russia

  • Ryhor Nizhnikau and Arkady Moshes
  • February 9, 2026
View
  • Policy Memos | Аналитика
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

Peacemaking Russian Style: Negotiations as the Continuation of War by Other Means

  • Pavel Baev
  • January 26, 2026
View
  • Policy Memos | Аналитика
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

‘DIY Warfare’: How Russia Crowdsources the Battlefield in Ukraine

  • Mariya Omelicheva
  • January 26, 2026
View
  • Policy Memos | Аналитика
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

Russia’s Loss of Reputation and Status in the Middle East: Potential Consequences for Putin at Home and Abroad

  • Kimberly Marten
  • January 12, 2026
View
  • Policy Memos | Аналитика
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

Where Concessions Meet Resolve: How Ukrainian Society Sees U.S. Efforts to End Russia’s War

  • Mikhail Alexseev and Serhii Dembitskyi
  • December 22, 2025
View
  • Policy Memos | Аналитика
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

Hammering In the Last Nail: Georgian Dream Targets Universities

  • Stephen F. Jones
  • December 22, 2025
PONARS Eurasia
  • About Us
  • Membership
  • Policy Memos
  • Recommended
  • Events
Powered by narva.io

Permissions & Citation Guidelines

Input your search keywords and press Enter.