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Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 led to an active discussion in the scholarly and policy communities about approaches to studying the states in Eastern Europe. Scholars in Ukraine were especially vocal in raising concerns about widespread misconceptions in the West that compromised not only sound scholarly analysis but also effective policymaking, the most widely cited example being the failure of many observers to anticipate Russia’s full-scale invasion and the sustained mobilization of the Ukrainian people to resist it. Scholars in the states of the Caucasus and Central Asia had earlier raised similar concerns about the Russian and Soviet colonial legacies, as well as colonial attitudes in the Kremlin’s current policy toward these states and regions.
This “soul-searching” done in response by scholars has resulted in several timely publications and policy memos. Many scholars have problematized labeling the states in ways that firmly attach them to the Soviet Union, like “post-Soviet” or “postcommunist.” Others have highlighted the colonial nature of the Soviet communist project, suggesting that the failure to recognize this has contributed to a failure to anticipate Moscow’s expansionist policy in Ukraine and elsewhere. Meanwhile, some scholars have pushed back, questioning the extent to which a decolonial lens is helpful for understanding this diverse space. Still others have called attention to the need to listen more to “underrepresented” voices. They point out that the predominance of Russian perspectives in Western academia has obscured these alternative perspectives (see here and here). Moreover, the so-called “Russian” perspective is primarily that of Moscow and St. Petersburg, meaning voices from other parts of this large, multinational state go largely unheard (see here, for example).
To widen and deepen these discussions, a group of scholars in 2023 formed a taskforce, which we called Amplifying Voices of Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia (AVECCA). The broad question the taskforce set out to study was: What misconceptions are common about the states and peoples of Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia? We define misconceptions as inaccurate beliefs and assumptions embedded in habits of thinking, dominant media narratives, the policy discourse, and academic and educational frameworks. Identifying and correcting misconceptions is a critical step to better understanding and more effectively interacting with these regions, we believe. The taskforce included scholars from Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Russia (specifically from outside of Moscow).
The project proceeded in several stages. In 2023–2024, we solicited input on the topic of misperceptions from within the large network of the Program on New Approaches to Research and Security in Eurasia (PONARS Eurasia). We also spoke to members of the policy and think-tank communities in the United States and United Kingdom with a view to identifying themes we should pursue. Together, these conversations helped us to shape questions for the next stage of the project, a survey of scholars from the given regions. We sought out respondents in the scholarly communities of Central Asian states, the Caucasus states, Ukraine, and Russia whose voices are poorly represented in Western academic and policy circles, because they do not publish in English, are not well networked with Western academic institutions, or are otherwise disadvantaged, for instance, due to a lack of resources to attend conferences in Europe or the United States. Using snowball sampling, we surveyed scholars in Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, and Russia, with the questionnaires translated into the titular language of each state.
The study encountered several challenges. Some scholars living under authoritarian regimes understandably felt too vulnerable to complete the survey. In Ukraine, limited access to electricity, due to the war, made responding to the online survey impossible for some. The responses that we did receive, 80 in total, nonetheless allow us to identify several themes among misconceptions about the regions of Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Note that most questionnaires were incomplete, with many respondents answering only the yes/no questions and skipping the open-ended ones. We analyzed all responses and used answers from the open-ended questions for illustrative purposes in this memo. In many ways, the responses chime with the initial discussions we held within the PONARS Eurasia network. Though the sample is small, the findings of the survey will hopefully help shape future conversations and larger studies.
Persistent Reductionism
Many respondents pointed to the continued tendency to reduce diverse societies to broad, flattening categories such as “post-Soviet” or “Eurasian.” This framing obscures historical depth and contemporary agency, effectively “freezing” states in a transitional moment rather than understanding them as dynamic and evolving. It also reflects a lingering area-studies legacy. The label “post-Soviet” is perceived as problematic, as is, relatedly, the expectation that everyone speaks Russian, which respondents considered an insulting throwback to the colonial pattern of domination over subaltern lands. As one respondent in Armenia stated, critiquing Western assumptions:
[I]f we mean an external—primarily Western—perspective, then perhaps the greatest misconception, one that arises from a partial truth, is the assumption that we, and the processes within our society, can be understood simply by reducing them to the fact of being a post-Soviet state. This is a form of reductionism. A more specific, everyday manifestation of this can be seen in the fact that even in academic circles, when people hear where you are from, they often have a vague image of you as some subtype of Russian, assume that you speak Russian, and so on. (Italics added for emphasis)A respondent in Kyrgyzstan complained that “instead of studying and uncovering the real, perhaps nonobvious causes of a contemporary issue, [policymakers tend] to automatically fit them into ready-made, template-based analyses (such as attributing them simply to the fact of being post-Soviet).”
At the extreme, reductionism conflates states in the broader region or does not even recognize them as states. One PONARS Eurasia respondent noted that Armenia has been mistaken for Albania and Romania, while the Armenian language has been confused with Aramaic.
Russocentrism
Related to the theme of reductionism are perceptions among respondents of entrenched Russocentrism in the study of, and policy toward, the regions in question. A major through line—especially among non-Russian respondents—is the “gravitational pull” of Russia (and, in some cases, the West) on structuring knowledge about states in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. These states are frequently framed as Russia’s “backyard,” “satellites,” or derivative spaces, i.e., passive objects in broader hegemonic projects. This erases local agency and leads to misreadings of political alignments and trajectories. More broadly, it suggests a form of imperialism in which both the former metropole (Russia) and external forces (one PONARS respondent even criticized PONARS Eurasia itself) continue to shape how these regions are understood. The debate among AVECCA members on whether to call the conflict “Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine” or the “Russia-Ukraine war” illustrates how established analytical frameworks can struggle to keep pace with evolving realities on the ground: Whereas the former characterization accurately captured the nature of the conflict in 2022 and Moscow’s responsibility for starting the war, it may no longer encapsulate what has turned into a multidimensional conflict, in which Russia itself is ablaze amid effective strikes by the Ukrainian army.
Our respondents noted that Russocentrism is evident not only in rhetoric but in policy as well, most prominently in how powerful states like the United States perceive the Russia-Ukraine war—and adapt Russia’s narratives to justify U.S. policy toward the war. One respondent flagged the dangerous fallacy that Ukraine is “part of Russia” and a “non-European state”, with the failure to treat Ukraine as a sovereign, European state fraught with risks for the sustainability of “the security of Euro-Atlantic civilization.”
Another Ukrainian respondent noted:
The idea that Ukraine is a traditional sphere of political influence for the Russian Federation, that there are regions and segments of the population in Ukraine where a significant share of people is loyal to the Russian Federation, and that this therefore legitimizes the Russian Federation’s claims and control over these regions. This was most clearly articulated and voiced recently by [U.S. President Donald] Trump, who said that “to be honest,” there are Russian-speaking regions in Ukraine. Based on this, Russia’s claims to these territories have a legitimate basis, and these territories can be used as a bargaining chip with Russia.
Essentialist, Cultural Stereotyping
Respondents repeatedly identified essentialist representations—Central Asia as “clannish” or “extremist,” Armenia as uniformly “industrious,” Ukraine as irredeemably corrupt, and Russia as inherently authoritarian—as key misconceptions. These narratives reduce complex societies to fixed traits and reproduce cultural binaries. Respondents also flagged clichés like bride kidnapping and deep religiosity (Kyrgyzstan), “only… a source of raw materials” (Kazakhstan), and corruption and alcohol consumption (Russia).
Respondents underscored the persistence of binary and oversimplified frameworks: Ukraine as a “divided state,” Russia as either fully controlled by or fully supportive of the regime, Kyrgyzstan as divided by “clan politics” or regional cleavages. This reflects a trend of “complexity intolerance,” driven by the incentives of media and academic production, as well as bureaucratic inertia. Many journalists, scholars, and policymakers may find it easier to revert to tropes because of a lack of exposure to alternative perspectives, which may come down to training—leading academic institutions in North America and Europe have established programs in Russian studies but fewer on other states bordering Russia.
The strongest opinions about binary and oversimplified frameworks came from respondents in Ukraine. These misconceptions have become entrenched in part because Ukrainians struggle to insert their voice into academic and policy discussions that are dominated by scholars with ties to Russia.
Meanwhile, Central Asia continues to be viewed through a security lens that hackneys it as a “region of Islamist extremism.” A contributing factor was proposed by a respondent from Uzbekistan:
The spread of this misconception about Uzbekistan in Western states was influenced by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, carried out by the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. As a result, people in Western states began applying perceptions associated with states ending in “-stan” to the entire region.
Similarly, another respondent from Uzbekistan wrote, “Many people associate Uzbekistan with Afghanistan and think of it as a zone of instability.” Several PONARS Eurasia respondents explicitly noted that such narratives are reinforced by academia itself. This view of Central Asia has consequences for policy and funding, leading to a prioritization of security. Respondents from Uzbekistan also claim that it has impeded tourism and foreign investment, undermining the state’s economic prosperity.
Coproduction of Misconceptions
Some respondents mentioned coproduction of misconceptions as an issue. Local actors, including government officials, business and cultural elites, and intellectuals, sometimes reinforce oversimplified narratives about their national context, owing to strategic and institutional reasons. Thus, not all misconceptions are external impositions. Respondents from Armenia, for instance, noted the prevalence of narratives about the Armenian genocide at the expense of other issues that are just j as important for understanding the politics and foreign policy of the nation.
Another important misconception or misinterpretation regarding [Armenia] is viewing us primarily as a people who have suffered genocide (or who pursue a politics of genocide recognition) and understanding us exclusively through that lens. I should note that in the formation of both of these misinterpretations, our own role has been the greatest. (Italics added for emphasis)
A related point is that local narratives can have a self-reproducing logic.
This directly affects our own self-perception and its limitations, since identity has a relational, mirror-like aspect: How you present yourself influences how the Other perceives you, and vice versa. In short, external and internal misconceptions become intertwined, and this begins to constrain a more layered and complex description.
In addition, a Ukrainian scholar critiqued compatriots in academia whose publications help amplify distorted images about Ukraine in the West:
… there are radical nationalists in Ukraine who want to use force to keep regions, where a significant portion of the population is Russian-speaking or loyal to the Russian Federation for other reasons, under Ukrainian control. This perception is sometimes held even by Ukrainian academics who write articles in peer-reviewed journals, present themselves as Ukrainians, and influence Western audiences, effectively promoting Russian narratives. (Italics added for emphasis)
Again, respondents stressed that these are not merely discursive issues. Misperceptions have tangible consequences, shaping policy choices, influencing aid allocations, distorting analysis, and being used, in the case of Ukraine, to justify dangerously misguided positions. For example, corruption in Kyiv is frequently weaponized in debates in the U.S. Congress to hold up political and military support for Ukraine. Similarly, a counterterrorism lens has long dominated Washington’s approach to Central Asia, at times at the expense of addressing a broader set of political, economic, and societal issues. More broadly, narratives around Moscow’s “historic” claims to great-power status have reinforced a great-power competition framework, encouraging U.S. policymakers to view engagement in the region through a lens of countering Russia as a geopolitical rival.
Conclusion
Our project reveals a picture of inherited categories, external reference points, and simplified narratives that impede effective research and policymaking.The Russia-Ukraine war has served as a wake-up call as to these dangers—like seeing Ukraine as irredeemably divided, considering Russia a monolithic society, and treating the regions bordering Russia as a gray collection of states lacking agency and full sovereignty—while spotlighting how deeply embedded oversimplified ideas are among elites and intellectuals both in the West and locally.
At the same time, the survey responses suggest that moving beyond these misconceptions requires a broader rethinking of how knowledge about the region is produced, for instance, asking tough questions about the categories being used and the degree of granularity applied. Yet even our respondents often struggled to articulate the bounds of a “misconception” and alternatives to disagreeable terms such as “Eurasia.” To paraphrase one UK-based policy expert, there is much encouragement to practice “geopolitical correctness” in the pursuit of better understanding but there are far fewer concrete solutions how to move beyond conventions.
The challenge is less about replacing one set of labels with another, however, and more about shifting the underlying approach to treat Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia as sets of dynamic and internally diverse societies.
Tomila Lankina is Professor at the International Relations Department of LSE, UK. She is Editor-in-Chief of Post-Soviet Affairs and an Einstein Visiting Fellow at the Excellence Cluster SCRIPTS at Freie Universität Berlin, Germany.
Kelly M. McMann is the Lucy Adams Leffingwell Professor in the Department of Political Science at Case Western Reserve University, USA. She is also the project manager for subnational government for Varieties of Democracy.
Mariya Omelicheva is a Professor of Strategy and Chair at the National War College, National Defense University, USA.
Emil Dzhuraev is Senior Lecturer at the OSCE Academy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan
Ivan Gomza is Associate Professor at the Public Policy and Governance Program, Kyiv School of Economics, Ukraine
Paul Goode is Professor and McMillan Chair in Russian Studies at the Institute of European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies, Carleton University, Canada
Nona Shahnazarian is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Archaeology and Ethnography, National Academy of Sciences, Yerevan, Republic Armenia; and Co-director of the NGO Centre for Independent Social Research Armenia (CISR Armenia).
Guzel Yusupova is Research Fellow at the Center for Russian, Central and East European Studies, University of Glasgow, UK
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