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After the death of the leading Russian dissident and opposition politician Alexei Navalny in a Siberian penal camp was announced on February 16, 2024, most Western decision-makers criticized Moscow and simultaneously praised the courage of Russia’s most famous political prisoner. The reaction in Kyiv, however, was very different. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky described Navalny’s death as further proof of the Putin regime’s tyranny but refrained from honoring Navalny’s legacy. Similarly, Ukraine’s attitude, on the official and public-opinion level, toward the August 2024 prisoner swap between Western states and Russia was characterized by suspicion. This sentiment was reinforced after some of the released Russian political prisoners, like Vladimir Kara-Murza and Ilya Yashin, attracted attention with questionable statements about Russia’s war against Ukraine.
In this regard, in a January 2025 interview with the Kyiv Independent, the former World Chess Champion Garry Kasparov, who has lived in U.S. exile since 2013, criticized the ambiguous position of many Russian dissidents toward Ukraine. Kasparov, an avowed critic of the Navalny team, questioned the political self-image and goals of the Russian opposition, which has no convincing answer as to what its activities are directed against. Whereas there is a common dislike for Putin, opinions within the Russian opposition are divided on the Ukraine issue. This memo explores the three main drivers of the Ukrainian skepticism toward the Russian opposition in exile: first, the ambiguity of its position regarding the annexation of Crimea and Western arming of Ukraine; second, the narrow focus of its activities and its not being sufficiently pro-Ukrainian; and third, its political instrumentalization of Western support for Ukraine.
Ukrainian Stance on Russian Opposition Frozen in 2014
The strained relationship between Ukraine and the Russian opposition is often wrongly reduced to a single statement by Navalny from October 2014. Shortly after Russia illegally annexed Crimea, Navalny failed clearly to answer a question from Russian journalist Alexei Venediktov as to whether Crimea was now finally “Russian.” Navalny responded with a counterquestion: “Is Crimea just some kind of sandwich passed back and forth?” This evasive answer found little understanding in Ukraine, then and now.
This not only “froze” the relationship between Ukraine and the Russian opposition but also reduced the Russian opposition to a single actor. The Russian opposition is much more complex, however. It is a diffuse network of various actors who are internally divided about the most effective strategies against the Kremlin and on the question of who is to lead the opposition movement; who frequently renegotiate their alliances; and whose “distance” from the Kremlin varies significantly. The often highly permeable barrier between the “nonsystemic” (pro-regime change) and “systemic” (anti-regime change) opposition in Russia makes it very difficult for many Russians, and especially for many outside observers, to distinguish between “friend” and “foe” reliably. With the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the nonsystemic opposition, at least at the leadership level, can now operate almost only from exile (note that there exists a separate, armed wing of the nonsystemic opposition).
Furthermore, reducing the Russian opposition to a single statement by Navalny from 2014 rules out any possibility of a gradual evolution of the political views of individual Russian opposition figures toward Ukraine. In its “15-point manifesto” from February 2023, the Navalny team announced the restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine within its 1991 borders (meaning Crimea being returned to Ukraine) as one of its core goals. At this point, the only parts of the nonsystemic Russian opposition still openly claiming occupied Crimea and eastern Ukraine as historical Russian territories and supporting the war of aggression against Ukraine are either on the far right (e.g., the constituency of the Russian ultranationalist and former paramilitary leader Igor Girkin) or on the far left (e.g., the followers of the Left Front led by Sergei Udaltsov). Interestingly, the Kremlin imprisoned both Girkin and Udaltsov in 2023 and 2024, respectively.
Moreover, this reductionist perspective ignores other Ukrainian reservations about the Russian opposition in exile, including its political ambiguity toward the Crimea annexation and Western arms deliveries to Ukraine, its lack of a clear pro-Ukraine commitment, and its exploitation of Western support for Ukraine for political purposes.
Core Ambiguities of the Russian Opposition
Kyiv was not always so skeptical of the Russian opposition. During the 2011–2012 mass protests against election fraud in Russia’s Duma election, numerous Ukrainian media outlets provided a platform for Russian opposition activists to reach viewers in Russia, and several Russian journalists and activists found refuge in Ukraine before and after the protests. In addition, famous Russian dissidents, like the late Boris Nemtsov, admired the two successful Ukrainian protest movements of 2004–2005 and 2013–2014 and viewed them as possible triggers for democratic changes in Russia.
The Kremlin’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, however, confronted the Russian opposition with a political dilemma: how to handle the issue of the occupied Ukrainian peninsula in future elections in Russia. Western arms deliveries to Ukraine became another political hot potato: Ultimately, these weapons are meant to kill Russian soldiers (i.e., relatives/friends of potential voters) and destroy (military-industrial) factories (i.e., places of employment of potential voters).
Thus, instead of geopolitics, the Russian opposition (especially the Navalny team) has preferred to focus on corruption among Putin’s elites with a populism-tinged message. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, however, the opposition cannot entirely avoid the Ukraine issue. It now usually highlights the economic costs of the military intervention for “ordinary” Russian taxpayers, with the suffering of “ordinary” Ukrainians being mentioned only in passing, if at all.
Anti-Putin but Not Pro-Ukrainian
Opposition activity against the Kremlin should not be confused with a pro-Ukrainian attitude. The outbreak of the war in 2022 has cast the Russian opposition’s former election tactics, in particular, the Smart Voting app deployed by Navalny’s team, in a completely new light. Smart Voting, used originally in the 2019 Moscow City Duma election and later in the 2021 Duma election, recommends local candidates with the highest chance of winning against representatives of the ruling United Russia party. The problem was, however, that most of the recommended and later successful candidates belonged to the systemic or pro-Kremlin opposition parties (especially the KPRF). They have supported the full-scale war against Ukraine since February 2022 and, in some cases, voice even more radical views on Ukraine than the Kremlin.
In March 2023, Ukraine seemingly saw its skepticism toward the Russian opposition confirmed again. It came to light that Leonid Volkov, who then chaired the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK), founded by Navalny, had secretly worked as a lobbyist for the Russian bank Alfa Group and its co-owners. In a personal letter to the former High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell, in autumn 2022, Volkov asked for the assets of Russian banking magnate Mikhail Fridman to be removed from the EU sanctions list. The letter claimed that Fridman had donated considerable sums to Ukraine since the beginning of the war. Due to the ensuing scandal, Volkov resigned from his post at FBK. To what extent the rest of the Navalny team was involved in such lobbying remains unclear. Volkov insists that he acted by himself.
Note that Zelensky was involved in a comparable “scandal.” In March 2022, the Wall Street Journal reported that the Ukrainian president had personally asked then-President Joe Biden not to sanction the Kremlin-friendly Russian billionaire Roman Abramovich. Abramovich has been informally mediating between Kyiv and Moscow on Putin’s behalf since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022.
Instrumentalization of Western Support for Ukraine
The Russian opposition’s opportunistic behavior did not end here. With the outbreak of the war, exiled oppositionists realized that a new political wind was blowing in the West. Because many Western states swiftly threw their support behind Ukraine, the opposition could no longer avoid the issue of Ukraine as it had done before, especially since many members of the opposition depend on the munificence of Western governments.
That is why the opposition in exile consistently links its lobbying work in the West to Ukraine. Its projects are linked to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, such as the April 2022 sanctions list compiled by the Navalny team (“The FBK 6,000 List”), to appear more palatable to Western decision-makers. The Anti-Corruption Foundation claims that all the individuals on its list support Russia’s war; however, a closer look reveals that many of them have publicly positioned themselves against the war (which has led to their persecution by the Kremlin). The FBK list, therefore, also serves as a means of putting pressure on political rivals within the Russian opposition and/or critics of the Navalny team.
Good Opposition/Bad Opposition
Against this backdrop, it is unsurprising that the Zelensky administration relies more on the Russian opposition’s armed wing. Russian units, such as the Freedom of Russia Legion, have been fighting against the Russian army as part of the Ukrainian armed forces since the beginning of the war. These battle-hardened units are politically more “convenient” for Kyiv. Firstly, they demonstrate their opposition to the Putin regime with armed action, not just words. Their ability to conduct raids into Russian territory (as seen in Belgorod Region in 2023 and 2024) makes civil war scenarios on Russian territory more real and gives Kyiv a proxy actor with which to threaten Moscow (even after ceasefire negotiations). Secondly, these units operate under the Ukrainian supreme command, so they are unlikely to compete for influence with Western governments (in contrast to the Russian opposition’s political wing).
Nonetheless, Ukraine pays attention to Russia’s political opposition in exile. Through its Main Intelligence Directorate, Kyiv organizes regular meetings of the Russian opposition’s political and armed wings on Ukrainian territory. The last conference, the Russian Opposition Forum in Support of Ukraine, took place in Lviv in May 2024. Many important opposition figures, including representatives of the Navalny team, did not attend. Some well-known opposition figures, like Mikhail Khodorkovsky, participated only remotely. More than 40 other dissidents who are rather “backbenchers” in the Russian opposition were present. These include Ilya Ponomarev, a former Duma deputy who is said to be the main sponsor of the armed opposition, and Mark Feygin, a Russian lawyer who served in the Duma in the 1990s. Ukraine hopes the tactic of holding conferences will give it leverage over further developments within the Russian opposition in exile and, to some degree, in Russian domestic politics. However, Ukraine’s contacts with the armed opposition often leads to reservations among the Russian political opposition about cooperation with Kyiv, since the political careers of many Russians fighting for Ukraine began in right-wing extremist circles in Russia.
These conferences on Ukrainian territory pose risks for the Zelensky administration, as well—some Ukrainian actors view them with suspicion. For example, the mayor of Lviv, Andriy Sadovyi, made a public request to the Ukrainian security services during the last gathering, claiming to have not been informed that “some Russian opposition groups” were meeting in his city. This broadly reflects the high level of distrust of the Ukrainian population toward the Russian opposition in exile.
Lastly, Zelensky’s recent comments during a March 28 briefing suggest that Kyiv also has its eyes on systemic opposition actors within the Russian elite and still believes in the possibility of defections inside the Kremlin. The Ukrainian president argued that, instead of negotiating with Putin, who is bent on continuing the war, Kyiv would be ready to talk to representatives of Kremlin-affiliated business, regional elites, and/or the “opposition” that is interested in ending the fighting.
Conclusion
Kyiv’s skepticism toward the Russian opposition in exile has its roots in the Russian opposition’s ambiguous and opportunistic behavior when dealing with the Ukraine issue. The prospects for intensified contacts between the Russian opposition in exile and Ukraine remain rather slim due to this toxic history. After a potential ceasefire agreement, Ukraine will likely hold a presidential election (due to martial law in effect in the country, elections have been postponed), and perceived proximity to the Russian opposition in exile would reduce any candidate’s chances of winning. For their part, Russian dissidents skeptically view an overly close alliance with Kyiv, since the Kremlin’s propaganda machine would immediately exploit this proximity and portray it as treason. The influence of the exiled opposition inside Russia would thus decline further.
Regardless of the election, other crucial points of friction remain, like the conditions for the lifting of sanctions against Russia, the prosecution of war crimes, reparations, the recognition by Russians of collective responsibility for the war, and the opposition’s silence on the abductions of Ukrainian children. As a result, the most likely scenario moving forward is Ukraine continuing to lean on and build up the Russian opposition’s armed wing.
Boris Ginzburg is a doctoral researcher at the Institute for East European Studies (Politics
Department) at the Freie Universität Berlin (Germany). This memo is an updated version of a
previous article.
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