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In early March 2025, reports from Bloomberg and Reuters, among other outlets, claimed that, during their February 12 phone conversation, Russian President Vladimir Putin offered President Donald Trump Russia’s assistance as a mediator in talks with Iran over its nuclear program. This development highlights the remarkable thaw in U.S.-Russia relations under the new U.S. administration. While Russia is by no means the leading element of Trump’s approach to dealing with the Islamic Republic and cannot secure him the result he seeks, it is worth exploring the motivations behind Putin’s mediation offer.
Firstly, he wants to maintain the positive movement in relations with the United States, especially as discussions on his main area of interest—Ukraine—have only just begun. Secondly, Putin is aware that Russia’s position in the Middle East is weakened (because of the war in Ukraine). He wants to prevent a military escalation in the Iran nuclear standoff at a time when Russia is hardly in a position to help its important regional ally. Moreover, the Middle East is a region with which Russia has engaged to assert its claim to great power status, so being part of a complex negotiating process with Iran could be a strong boost to Russia’s declining prestige.
Putin’s Mediation Offer
It remains unclear where the idea of Russian mediation originated. Bloomberg suggests that Trump made such inquiries with Putin, while Reuters cites an unnamed White House source claiming Putin made an offer without being asked. Later reports indicate that, during the February 18 meeting in Saudi Arabia between the U.S. and Russian delegations, Russian mediation was discussed again. Notably, Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, visited Iran on February 25 and met with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. Russia’s Foreign Ministry confirmed that the two had “coordinated their positions regarding the state of affairs surrounding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action [JCPOA] on the Iranian nuclear program,” without providing further details. Reports claim that Lavrov encouraged the Iranians to speak directly with Washington and bypass Western European intermediaries.
The Russia card is only one of several options for Washington. Indeed, Trump wants to deal with the Iranians directly. He sent a letter to Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, urging negotiations over the nuclear program, while keeping the military option on the table. The two sides began talks on April 12 in Oman, where they agreed to continue them. Moscow reiterated its support and readiness to lend its assistance in reaching an agreement, but it also criticized threats of military action. Notably, Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, visited Moscow on April 17–18 and met with Putin and Lavrov. Few details about the issue of mediation were revealed by official Russian government sources. During the press conference with his Iranian counterpart, Lavrov reiterated Russia’s readiness “to help, mediate, and… play any role that will be useful and acceptable to the United States from Iran’s point of view.” Likely discussed was Russia’s role as a potential host to Iran’s uranium stockpile, which Washington has demanded Tehran give up. Importantly, Russia did this in 2015, when the JCPOA was negotiated.
Putin’s “goodwill” offer is motivated by a desire to cozy up to the new U.S. president. Trump restored communication with Moscow after a virtual freeze during the last three years under former President Joe Biden. Putin’s strategy is tied directly to Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine. The current conditions on the battlefield favor his army, hence he is delaying a ceasefire to strengthen his negotiating position. Simultaneously, he keeps up the appearance with Trump that he wants to talk. The proposal to help the Americans with Iran appears to be a helpful gesture, but it is also meant to distract Trump from Ukraine.
Moscow’s Vulnerable Position in the Middle East
Putin’s second motivation is Russia’s weakened position in the Middle East. Historically, the region never ranked among Russia’s top foreign policy priorities. Nonetheless, it has received attention in recent times due to historical ties with specific countries, Russia’s growing Muslim population, concern over regional actors’ support for separatist groups in Russia (i.e., in Chechnya), the sale of Russian weapons, the courting of Gulf investors, relations with OPEC, etc. In certain periods, the Middle East garnered more attention from Russian policymakers—for instance, in the mid-2010s, during the emergence of the Islamic State terrorist group, which was officially identified by Moscow as one of the “one of the most dangerous realities” of the contemporary world.
This changed with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Russia openly proclaimed that it sought to bolster relations with Iran, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, among other states. The leading reason for this was the collapse of Russia’s relations with Western states, which, since 2022, have sought to isolate Russia internationally. In this context, Moscow was desperate to reinvigorate old relationships and identified the Muslim nations of the Middle East as “friendly civilizations.” Putin stated that “Russia has long-standing and positive relations with Arab states” and should “find new points of convergence” and “deepen… partnerships across the board.”
Yet Russia’s declared greater interest in cooperation with the region has not translated into a greater allocation of resources toward it. Since the start of its invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s position in the Middle East has been weakening. Putin has become consumed by the war, which he sees as a global struggle against the West. He has poured most of Russia’s resources into this conflict and relegated to secondary importance other foreign policy objectives, including the Syrian civil war, where he had achieved great success. As early as spring 2022, Moscow had redeployed military resources from Syria and Libya, including mercenaries of Wagner Group, to support its war against Ukraine.
The December 2024 collapse of the Assad government in Syria encapsulated Russia’s weaker position in the region. It marked a symbolic and geopolitical blow to Russia’s regional standing. Russia had failed to protect its ally, which sent a message to others relying on Russia’s help. It was discredited as a self-proclaimed defender of minority groups like Syrian Christians. Meanwhile, the geopolitical ramifications are potentially far reaching. Historian Sergey Radchenko points out that, should Russia be denied future use of its military bases in Syria (a naval facility called Tartus and an air base called Khmeimim), its ability to project power will have shrunk not just in Syria and the area around Syria, but in North Africa and the Sahel as well. It would mark a “strategic defeat and perhaps the end of Putin’s ambitions in the Middle East.” While the fate of Russia’s military presence in Syria remains uncertain, with the new Syrian rulers showing openness to negotiations with Moscow, it is unlikely to wield anywhere near the influence there that it had over Syrian leader Bashar al Assad.
If there is an area where Russia’s activity in the Middle East has increased, it is cooperation with Iran. However, this was driven not by Russia’s strength but rather by its weakness and desperate struggles in Ukraine throughout 2022. After Russia was hit by sanctions and cut off from most suppliers of technology, it turned to Iran for weapons (especially for so-called “kamikaze drones”), ammunition, and advice on working under sanctions and operating a shadow fleet of oil tankers. Iran was willing to help, both for the sake of their mutual opposition to the United States and the liberal international order and because Tehran saw in Russia’s weakened hand an opportunity to press for the sale of previously denied weapons systems, such as Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets and advanced S-400 surface-to-air missiles. In January 2025, the Iranians confirmed the purchase of Su-35s. However, Russia remains hesitant about selling S-400 missiles. It is concerned that that might damage its relations with Iran’s regional rivals (e.g., Saudi Arabia), with which Russia has cordial relations, and further strain ties with the United States. Ultimately, the fact that Russia has come to rely to such an extent on Iran demonstrates how the war in Ukraine has weakened Russia and how their partnership has been reshaped in ways unimaginable before 2022 (when the Russians treated the Iranians like another regional proxy), with Tehran turning into Moscow’s critical collaborator.
Mediation and Status
In addition, status considerations play a significant role in Russia’s outreach to the United States with regard to Iran. Indeed, Russia’s attention to and activities in the Middle East, including direct intervention in Syria, was tied to its pursuit of great power status. This status, however, has been diminished since it invaded Ukraine. Russia’s once-touted military underperformed against a much smaller state and barely controls 20 percent of Ukraine today, three years after the war started. Russia has been diplomatically isolated and repeatedly denounced by the United Nations General Assembly over its actions in Ukraine.
Putin seeks to reverse these losses to Russia’s prestige, and the new Trump administration has given him such an opportunity. One way for status-seekers to increase their status is to engage in mediation. Usually associated with small, reputed neutral states like Norway, mediation is sometimes conducted by great powers as well. It highlights their soft power prowess and desire to undertake greater responsibility for the management of world affairs. Readiness to engage in finding solutions to lingering international crises improves a state’s visibility and image.
Russia has engaged in mediation both in its neighborhood and farther abroad. Its tactics have been described as “coercive mediation,” because they involve power politics and the threat of force, co-optation, sowing division among opponents, and obtaining legitimacy for various rebel factions. Recently, Russia applied this approach in dealing with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, where it had leverage over the former, particularly dependent on Russia. In autumn 2020, Putin brokered a ceasefire between the two states that saw the deployment of around 2,000 Russian “peacekeepers” along the line of separation.
Russia has sought to mediate in Syria and Libya as well. It tries to present itself as a fair broker eager to talk to nearly all stakeholders even as it stands firmly by one side and supports it with arms, funding, and political cover, as was the case with Assad (until December 2024) and the Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar. Moscow has even offered to help bring together the Palestinians: In February 2024, Lavrov presided over a meeting of representatives of rival Palestinian groups who had come to Moscow to work toward achieving intra-Palestinian unity.
One constant in Russia’s mediation is that Moscow is concerned primarily with being noticed as an equal participant in negotiations alongside other important players, instead of securing a lasting outcome. In some instances, the likelihood of successful mediation was limited, but Moscow pursued it anyway, mainly to challenge what it perceived as U.S. monopolization of the peace process (i.e., the case of Israel–Palestine). Russia’s track record as a mediator is poor. It failed to achieve reconciliation in Syria and Libya and among the Palestinian factions; even when it managed to secure a ceasefire (i.e., in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020), it did not last long. In the latter case, there were violations of the truce and ultimately a renewal of hostilities that led to Azerbaijan’s victory over the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians in September 2023—a deep embarrassment for Russia, which had seemingly abandoned its allies.
Mediation remains a status-boosting exercise for Russia to get a seat at the negotiating table and raise its profile and visibility. Indeed, during the October 2024 meeting between the Chinese and Indian leaders on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia successfully played the role of “helpful host,” providing a neutral space for the parties to decide by themselves how and when to settle their Himalayan frontier dispute.
Could Moscow Help Washington with Iran?
Putin’s offer to mediate between the United States and Iran is driven by his desire to remain on good terms with the new U.S. president, combined with his concern about Russia’s declining prestige in the Middle East and beyond. Having allowed Assad to fall, Russia would be doubly embarrassed and suffer reputational damage if it did not appear to be supportive of the Iranians, at least diplomatically and potentially militarily. The two states recently signed a comprehensive partnership treaty, which, while not a military alliance, stipulates that the signatories will “strengthen cooperation in the field of security and defense.” However, given the all-consuming war in Ukraine, Moscow is hardly in a position to assist Tehran except through diplomacy.
Thus, Putin has a strong incentive to encourage the Iranians to accommodate the Americans. He is offering not just mediation but possibly also guarantees to both sides, perhaps proposing to host Iran’s stockpile of uranium. Over the past decade, Moscow worked with Washington and Russia’s Middle Eastern allies (e.g., Syria) to address various crises (e.g., the 2013 agreement on the removal of Syrian chemical weapons and the 2015 JCPOA) that prevented potential military escalation. Notably, in 2015, former President Barack Obama praised Russia’s helpful role in securing the original deal with Iran.
The difference between then and now is the lingering tension and distrust in the U.S.-Russia relationship, notwithstanding the thaw initiated by Trump. The confrontation over Ukraine overshadows any other joint initiative. Moreover, the issues in the Iran nuclear standoff will require complicated and months-long discussions at various expert levels, and it is uncertain whether all the parties have the patience to see them through. Notably, in March, Trump issued a two-month deadline for reaching a deal with Iran.
Lastly, there is the crucial question of how Iran would react to Russia’s involvement in the talks. During the abovementioned April 18 press conference, Lavrov assured that Russia, should it be involved in mediation, would “support in every possible way agreements that factor in the legitimate interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran.” Some experts doubt that the Iranians trust the Russians enough to accept their mediation, as they fear that Washington and Moscow could strike a deal at Iran’s expense. Indeed, given the history of Russian double-crossing when an opportunity came to reengage with the West, the Iranians have reason to be cautious. At the same time, it should be noted that, for several years now, Moscow has been showing signs that it sees Iran as an essential part of its broader anti-Western strategy of building a bloc with non-Western powers. Unlike in the past, when it used its relations with Iran as a bargaining chip in dealings with the United States primarily, Russia did not obstruct but actually advocated for Iran’s inclusion into non-Western associations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (in 2023, Iran was promoted from observer to full member) and BRICS (in January 2024, Iran, along with Egypt, Ethiopia, and the UAE, officially joined BRICS), steps the Iranians coveted, which suggests that Moscow seeks to establish long-term relations with Tehran.
Dr. Janko Šćepanović is an assistant professor of international politics at the Shanghai Academy of Global Governance and Area Studies (SAGGAS) of the Shanghai International Studies University. His research focuses on international relations theory, especially the role of status, as well as the empirical study of Russia’s foreign policy in the post-Soviet space, the Middle East, and Southeast Europe and regional institution-building in the post-Soviet space.
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