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One of the unexpected developments in Russia’s full-scale war on Ukraine has been North Korea’s involvement, marking the first time North Korean forces have fought overseas. North Korean support seems likely to continue, as North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-un effusively told Russian President Vladimir Putin in Beijing on September 3, 2025: “If there is something we can do to help Russia, we will definitely do it. We will consider it a brotherly duty and will do everything to help Russia.” North Korea’s involvement in Ukraine will create new impediments to ending the war and have a far-reaching impact on European and Asian security.
Support for the Russian War Effort
North Korea first revealed itself as a supporter of Russia’s war in July 2022, when it joined Syria, along with Russia itself, in recognizing the Russian annexation of the occupied Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk. After former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu met with North Korean defense officials in July 2023, North Korea began supplying large amounts of ammunition to Russia. According to analysis by the Open Source Center and Reuters, North Korea may have transferred as much as 5.8 million munitions (including 122-millimeter and 152-millimeter artillery shells, as well as 122- millimeter rockets) between August 2023 and April 2025. The scale and timing of these deliveries enabled Russia to sustain its advances and led to increased casualties for Ukraine, a RUSI study concluded.
In September 2023, Putin rolled out the red carpet for Kim and gave him a tour of Russia’s Vostochny Cosmodrome and a fighter jet plant, leading to speculation about North Korea’s wish list in exchange for its “unconditional support” for Moscow in Ukraine. In June 2024, Russia and North Korea concluded the DPRK-Russia Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, which included a mutual defense clause. This paved the way for North Korea to send approximately 15,000 troops to Kursk Region, where they were used to foil Ukraine’s strategy of drawing down Russian troops fighting on Ukrainian territory and providing leverage in any potential land swap.
Following meetings between Russia and North Korea in June 2025, Pyongyang will send 5,000 military construction workers to Kursk Region, plus 1,000 combat engineers for demining operations. According to Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (HUR) 12,000 North Koreans will go to Tatarstan by the year-end to work in drone manufacturing. Another 10,000 workers have already been sent to the Russian Far East to fill labor shortages, with potentially another 40,000 to be dispatched. United Nations sanctions on North Korea—which Russia was instrumental in ending—previously prohibited these labor contracts. North Koreans formerly worked in construction, the timber industry, and agriculture in the Russian Far East, and it remains to be seen whether the new contracts will remain in these areas, or these workers will go to support the Russian defense sector.
From Pyongyang’s perspective, involvement in the war has allowed North Korean troops to acquire valuable combat experience with modern weapons, not to mention the hard currency—not easily obtainable (at least legally) elsewhere—the war brings in. According to South Korea’s National Intelligence Service, each North Korean solider is paid $2,000 monthly, meaning that North Korea may be earning $30 million a month from these outsourced soldiers. Salaries for the North Korean laborers sent to Russia are sent directly to North Korea, the BBC has reported. The workers are paid only after they return—and even then only receive $100-200 of their pay, the rest kept by the North Korean state as “loyalty fees.”
In exchange for the North Korean contingent, Russia also is believed to be delivering more oil and food, as well as military technology, potentially including missile and submarine technology and fighter aircraft. Russian drone technology transfers and training have the potential to transform North Korean drone capabilities. According to Kyrylo Budanov, chief of the HUR, Russia is helping North Korea to manufacture long-range Shahed drones, which could have a major impact on the balance of power on the Korean Peninsula.
North Korea’s involvement in Ukraine has helped Russia to maintain, if not extend, its positions in Ukraine. By contributing to the available pool of recruits, albeit marginally, it has enabled Russia to reduce the cost of continuing the war. (Lucrative signing bonuses have bolstered recruitment within Russia, however, although budget constraints may translate into a decline in volunteers going forward.) Indeed, in Kursk Region, the well-timed infusion of North Korean troops made a difference. Ukrainian media have reported that some North Korean forces in Kursk are serving as drone operators and supporting Russian operations in Ukraine’s Sumy Region. As the sides try to reach an agreement to end the war, the role of North Korean forces in the conflict may create an additional impediment.
Impact on European Security
North Korean involvement in Ukraine has widened the war and brought the Korean conflict to Europe’s doorstep. For South Korea, the deepening Russia-North Korea military relationship is a source of new security concerns around North Korean military modernization and improved warfighting skills—with Russian support and technology. After North Korea and Russia signed the June 2024 strategic partnership agreement, the South Korean government indicated it would reconsider the type of military assistance that would be provided to Ukraine and introduced sanctions on several entities involved in arms transfers between Russia and North Korea.
South Korean public opinion is largely opposed to providing lethal aid to Ukraine, with 65.5 percent opposed versus 29.1 percent in favor, according to October 2024 polling. Nevertheless, South Korea has played a key role in resupplying the United States with artillery shells that were eventually provided to Ukraine. Although South Korean law prohibits sending lethal aid to war zones, South Korea outpaced all European countries with its indirect provision of 155-millimeter artillery shells in 2023. During the first two years of the war, South Korea provided 500,000 rounds of artillery shells to the United States to replace shells sent to Ukraine. Seoul also provided equipment to Ukraine for demining and humanitarian purposes.
Since ties with Russia began to grow closer, North Korea has displayed little interest in dialogue with the South, notwithstanding some initial overtures by newly elected South Korean President Lee Jae Myung to reduce tensions. While seeking to engage the North, the new government in Seoul also doubled humanitarian aid to Ukraine in 2025—$100 million was pledged for humanitarian aid and reconstruction. South Korea also indicated it would be willing to accept any North Korean POWs in Ukraine that request asylum. Thus, Ukraine has effectively become a “proxy battlefield” for Seoul and Pyongyang.
The Korean dimension of Russia’s war on Ukraine gives credence to voices in NATO and East Asia that seek to enhance NATO engagement with Asian states like South Korea and Japan. Korea is one of four Indo-Pacific countries (the others being Japan, Australia, and New Zealand) to participate in NATO summits since 2022. In October 2024, South Korea participated in a NATO defense ministers’ summit for the first time and has been expanding cooperation with the alliance in several areas, such as cyber defense, technology development, and arms control and nonproliferation.
Consequences for China-Russia-North Korea relations and Asian Security
The Chinese Foreign Ministry has claimed that “China is happy to see North Korea and Russia grow their ties and play a constructive role for the peace and stability of this region.” Meanwhile, China has refused to comment on North Korean forces fighting for Russia in Ukraine, even though this violated the oft-stated Chinese position against expanding the war. Nonetheless, as Russia-North Korea relations improved in 2024, Beijing’s ties to Pyongyang appeared to worsen. The specific reason is not fully clear, but China’s continued support for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula certainly contributed. For China, a nuclear North Korea lends weight to political forces in South Korea and Japan urging for a stronger military—including a minority in support of an independent nuclear capability—and to voices calling for a role for NATO in Asia. When Putin met with Kim in Pyongyang in 2024, Chinese officials were in Seoul meeting with their South Korean and Japanese counterparts. Their joint statement included language opposing the nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, drawing a rebuke from Pyongyang.
After Chinese Premier Li Qiang visited North Korea on October 9–11, 2025, to celebrate the 80th anniversary of North Korea’s ruling party, relations between Beijing and Pyongyang appeared to have warmed again. However, North Korean Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Pak Myong Ho denounced the discussion by Chinese President by Xi Jinping and South Korean President Lee Jae Myung of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula as a “pipe dream.” With more than 90 percent of North Korea’s trade with China, North Korea’s strategic partnership with Russia has provided greater leverage for Pyongyang in dealing with Beijing. Thus, despite North Korea’s apparent economic dependence on China, it was Xi Jinping who worked hard to reset relations during Kim’s September 2025 visit to Beijing for ceremonies commemorating the end of World War II. In contrast to the enthusiasm expressed in the meeting between Putin and Kim, the readout of the meeting between Xi and Kim put the formulaic nature of the interaction on display. Nevertheless, Xi treated Kim as an honored guest, holding a special, small bilateral reception marking the first time in six years that the two leaders had met.
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula used to be a position that Russia and China shared, yet they both dropped this demand in 2025. China may be calculating that the risks of tensions rising on the Korean Peninsula are lower with South Korea’s newly elected Lee—known for his support for engagement with the North. Even before Kim and Putin finalized their military alliance, in December 2023 the North Korean leader likened North-South relations to interactions between two hostile states. Russia’s support for North Korea, including its military, may provide Kim with the tools to act on this assessment. That is a situation China seeks to avoid—due to its immediate consequences for China’s northeast provinces that border North Korea, but also because a reckless act by Pyongyang would require Beijing to take a stand. Xi has sought to balance China’s strong economic ties with South Korea with China’s long-time relationship with North Korea—an alliance, on paper at least. China’s relationship with North Korea has been more inscrutable of late, however, and there has been little commentary about it in the Chinese media since the September 2025 Xi-Kim summit (except for the official readout).
North Korea’s Role in Russia’s War on Ukraine Deepens Uncertainties
Now that the initial contingent of North Korean forces has largely fulfilled their mission in Kursk Region, it remains to be seen how Russia will employ any additional forces from North Korea in the war. The Russia-North Korea strategic partnership agreement invokes mutual defense in the event of an invasion of either state, presumably referring to their own sovereign territory. Even if North Korean troops are not sent to the front lines, they appear to have been used already as drone operators, targeting Ukrainian territory from Russia, and could work in reconstruction in the occupied regions of Ukraine. It is likely that any ceasefire or peace settlement would need to address the role and location of North Korean nationals on occupied Ukrainian land.
Another key concern is the impact of Russia’s partnership on North Korea’s behavior on the Korean Peninsula. Thus far Kim has shown diminished interest in engaging with South Korea, despite some overtures by Lee. In the future, however, Kim may feel emboldened to use some of the new military hardware that Russia is providing—or at least less interested in bilateral or multilateral negotiations involving South Korea.
In the long term, once the war in Ukraine ends—and especially in the event of sanctions on Russia being lifted—North Korea’s leverage may decline, as Russia seeks to reinvigorate ties with South Korea. This already happened once, in the 1990s, when Russia sacrificed ties with Pyongyang, allowing the 1961 USSR-DPRK Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance to lapse in the interest of improved relations with Seoul. Nonetheless, Putin may see continued value in maintaining a long-term alliance with North Korea as a means of bolstering Russian security in Northeast Asia.
Prior to 2022, relations between Moscow and Seoul had been a priority for Putin, due to his interest in grandiose potential gas and transportation infrastructure projects connecting the Korean Peninsula to the Russian Far East, as well as South Korean participation in the development of the Russian Arctic. After the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, however, South Korea has complied with UN sanctions on Russia and imposed additional sanctions on entities supporting North Korea-Russia military ties. South Korea’s continued support for such sanctions and its role in backstopping ammunition supplies to Ukraine will be important moving forward. With a new, progressive president in Seoul and a new, hard-line prime minister in Tokyo, Sanae Takaichi, it is unclear how the leaders of South Korea and Japan (which also imposed its own sanctions on entities involved with Russia-North Korea military ties) will opt to hold Moscow and Pyongyang accountable for their joint military actions in Ukraine. In this context, maintaining strong U.S.-South Korea-Japan and EU-South Korea-Japan ties, as well as engagement between NATO and South Korea and Japan, will be significant in increasing the costs to Russia and China of North Korean military support for Russia’s war on Ukraine.
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