PONARS Eurasia
  • About
    • Contact
    • Membership
      • All Members
      • Core Members
      • Collegium Members
      • Associate Members
      • About Membership
    • Ukraine Experts
    • Executive Committee
  • Policy Memos
    • List of Policy Memos
    • Submissions
  • Podcasts
  • Online Academy
  • Events
    • Past Events
  • Recommended
  • Ukraine Experts
Contacts

Address
1957 E St NW,
Washington, DC 20052

adminponars@gwu.edu
202.994.5915

NEWSLETTER
Facebook
Twitter
YouTube
Podcast
PONARS Eurasia
PONARS Eurasia
  • About
    • Contact
    • Membership
      • All Members
      • Core Members
      • Collegium Members
      • Associate Members
      • About Membership
    • Ukraine Experts
    • Executive Committee
  • Policy Memos
    • List of Policy Memos
    • Submissions
  • Podcasts
  • Online Academy
  • Events
    • Past Events
  • Recommended
  • Ukraine Experts
DIGITAL RESOURCES
digital resources

Bookstore 📚

Knowledge Hub

Course Syllabi

Point & Counterpoint

Policy Perspectives

RECOMMENDED
  • A Rock and a Hard Place: The Russian Opposition in a Time of War | New Voices on Eurasia with Jeremy Ladd (April 11)

    View
  • The Russia Program at GW (IERES)

    View
  • The Evolving Concerns of Russians after the Invasion | New Voices on Eurasia with Sasha de Vogel (March 9)

    View
  • PONARS Eurasia Spring Policy Conference (March 3)

    View
  • Ukrainathon 2023 (Feb. 24-25)

    View
RSS PONARS Eurasia Podcast
  • The Putin-Xi Summit: What's New In Their Joint Communique ? February 23, 2022
    In this week’s PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman speaks with Russian China experts Vita Spivak and Alexander Gabuev about the February meeting between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, and what it may tell us about where the Russian-Chinese relationship is headed.
  • Exploring the Russian Courts' Ruling to Liquidate the Memorial Society January 28, 2022
    In this week’s PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with scholars Kelly Smith and Benjamin Nathans about the history, achievements, and impending shutdown of the Memorial Society, Russia's oldest and most venerable civic organization, and what its imminent liquidation portends for the Russian civil society.
  • Russia's 2021 census and the Kremlin's nationalities policy [Lipman Series 2021] December 9, 2021
    In this week’s PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with social scientist Andrey Shcherbak about the quality of the data collected in the recent population census and the goals of Vladimir Putin's government's nationalities policy
  • Active citizens of any kind are under threat [Lipman Series 2021] November 5, 2021
    In this week’s PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with Alexander Verkhovsky about the Kremlin's ever expanding toolkit against political and civic activists, journalists, and other dissidents.
  • Russia's Legislative Elections followup [Lipman Series 2021] October 4, 2021
    In this week’s PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with Tanya Lokot and Nikolay Petrov about the results of Russia’s legislative elections and about what comes next.
  • Why Is the Kremlin Nervous? [Lipman Series 2021] September 14, 2021
    In this week’s PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with Ben Noble and Nikolay Petrov about Russia’s September 17-19 legislative elections, repressive measures against electoral challengers, and whether to expect anything other than preordained results.
  • Vaccine Hesitancy in Russia, France, and the United States [Lipman Series 2021] August 31, 2021
    In this week's PONARS Eurasia Podcast episode, Maria Lipman chats with Denis Volkov, Naira Davlashyan, and Peter Slevin about why COVID-19 vaccination rates are still so low across the globe, comparing vaccine hesitant constituencies across Russia, France, and the United States.  
  • Is Russia Becoming More Soviet? [Lipman Series 2021] July 26, 2021
      In a new PONARS Eurasia Podcast episode, Maria Lipman chats with Maxim Trudolyubov about the current tightening of the Russian political sphere, asking whether or not it’s helpful to draw comparisons to the late Soviet period.
  • The Evolution of Russia's Political Regime [Lipman Series 2021] June 21, 2021
    In this week's episode of the PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with Grigory Golosov and Henry Hale about the evolution of Russia's political regime, and what to expect in the lead-up to September's Duma elections.
  • Volodymyr Zelensky: Year Two [Lipman Series 2021] May 24, 2021
    In this week's episode of the PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with Sergiy Kudelia and Georgiy Kasianov about Ukrainian President Zelensky's second year in office, and how he has handled the political turbulence of the past year.
  • Policy Memos | Аналитика

Are Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin Partners? Interpreting the Russia-China Rapprochement

  • July 19, 2019
  • Hilary Appel

(PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo) The blossoming of relations between the Russian and Chinese presidents has been prominently on display. Images have been widely distributed of Xi Jinping awarding Vladimir Putin the newly created Medal of Friendship, the two leaders celebrating Putin’s birthday, and Xi giving Putin Chinese cooking lessons. Since Xi became China’s president in 2013, he has met the Russian president around thirty times. This warming of relations has recently extended to a wide array of trade and investment agreements and cooperation in numerous joint naval and land military exercises. The Sino-Russia rapprochement has emerged alongside the intense deterioration of both U.S.-Russian and U.S.-Chinese relations. The Trump Administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy characterized both Russia and China as challengers to “American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity.” The report continues that they “are determined to make economies less free and less fair, to grow their militaries, and to control information and data to repress their societies and expand their influence.”

As the United States distances itself from both of these countries with trade wars and extended sanctions regimes, the connection between Russia and China is growing closer, with these emerging partners identifying new areas for economic, cultural, and military cooperation. The question remains, however, whether this is a temporary response to growing strategic competition with the United States or whether the advantages of enhanced cooperation run deeper, leading to a longer-term realignment in great power politics. The main answer is that in the present era, the Putin-Xi personal relationship will likely deepen given their shared values, interests, and common external pressures and constraints. One potential stumbling block, however, may be an emergent and sharply increasing rivalry involving the Belt & Road program and the Eurasian Economic Union, despite the leaders’ repeat expression of compatibility of the two economic initiatives.

Expanding Economic and Military Cooperation

In the economic realm, these two countries have identified numerous areas for cooperation. In order to cope with some of the negative impacts of the U.S. and EU sanctions, in particular Russian firms’ highly constrained access to capital, Russia has sought to attract Chinese investment. To this end, the Russian government first formally endorsed China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in May 2015, pronouncing the BRI compatible with the aims of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU); and more recently, Putin reaffirmed his support in April 2019 when attending the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing, stating that the BRI “built an important platform for expanding international cooperation.” Since 2015, China and Russia have advanced plans for long-term energy cooperation, and agreed to natural gas projects worth 400 billion dollars. Russia has also pursued Chinese investment in the oil sector, agreeing to sell to CEFC China a 14 percent stake in Rosneft for $9 billion in September 2017. Although this deal with Rosneft has stalled since 2018, China continues to negotiate with the Russian giant in order to secure access to Russian oil. This relationship is crucial given that Russia has become China’s greatest supplier of oil, surpassing Saudi Arabia in 2016.

In addition, Putin and Xi signed a simplified customs and free trade agreement in May 2018.  These efforts to expand trade and capital flows between their countries have already borne fruit. In 2018, Russian-Chinese trade surpassed 100 billion dollars, more than a 20 percent increase in bilateral trade from the previous year. China became Russia’s largest trading partner in 2018 (with $56 billion in export sales) and is also its greatest source of foreign direct investment. These advantages are not one-sided given that Russia has not only become China’s largest source of crude oil and electricity imports, but major increases in gas flows are imminent with the expected completion of a new pipeline in late 2019 (called “The Power of Siberia”). Moreover, Russia and China have repeatedly asserted their plans to reduce the use of U.S. dollars when possible in their trade with each other. They have reaffirmed their goal to denominate more bilateral contracts in rubles and RMBs rather than dollars, aiming to reduce the dominance of the dollar as a reserve currency.

The substantial increases in bilateral trade and impressive new investment deals are matched by important advances in military cooperation. For the past several years, Russia and China engaged in joint naval exercises in the Sea of Japan, the Baltic Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea. China also sent 3,500 troops to participate in Russia’s massive Vostok (“East”) military exercises in September 2018. According to some analysts, this is a notable development given that in the past, the Vostok exercises were interpreted by many as sharpening Russia’s readiness for a potential conflict with China. Joint naval exercises continued in May 2019, with the naval and airspace exercises held near Qingdao, an eastern coastal city.

In addition to joint simulations and exercises, Russia has loosened its controls on weapons exports to China. For several years, Russia had refused to sell advanced technology to China, alleging that Beijing had copied Russian technology and mass-produced it for export, capturing new market share. Specifically, Russia concluded that China’s Surface-to-Air Missiles System (SAM) was copied from Russia’s S-300 platforms, its submarines were copied from the Russian Project-877 and Project 636 Kilo class submarines, and China’s military aircraft Jian 11 was reverse engineered from Russia’s Sukhoi-27. Russia also determined that China’s L-15 supersonic aircraft and Hongqi SAM system were based on Russia’s weapons technology. However, in late 2015 Russia reversed its position and agreed to sell China some of its most advanced weapons systems for $7 billion, including 24 of Russia’s SU-35 Fighter Jets, Amur Submarines, and four of its S-400 Surface-to-Air Missile Systems.

The Kremlin seems willing to look past certain hurdles or challenges that deterred warmer relations with China in the past. For example, not only has Moscow moved beyond the issue of China copying Russian military technology, it has also downplayed other issues, such as sensitivities related to its 4,200 km border, in particular the territory around the Amur River with massive imbalances in population size and density. There are approximately six million Russians north of the border and 107 million Chinese to the south, and at times there have been tensions arising from shuttle trade and the movement of migrants. In a similar vein, Russia is showing greater flexibility toward China regarding the development of Arctic sea routes, despite the potential for competing interests. Both countries have strong interests in northern sea routes: Russia hopes to develop and control northern sea routes as the polar ice cap melts, and China wants to ensure its access to this alternative route to the Suez Canal to ship goods from eastern China to Europe. For China, the opening up of these sea lanes for longer periods of the year means reducing travel time from Dalian in China to Rotterdam in The Netherlands by 13 days.

Perhaps the most striking area where Russia has yielded to Chinese interests is in Central Asian development. Russia has offered verbal support to massive Chinese investment in Central Asia, a territory that had been part of Russia’s perceived sphere of interest. China has become the largest trading partner and source of FDI in Central Asia. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has led to enormous investment in transportation infrastructure, electricity grids, irrigation systems, and energy production in Central Asia. These investments secure China’s access to raw materials in Central Asia for the long run and facilitate the reorientation of the region toward China, especially Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. The BRI’s major projects include the China-Central Asia Pipeline—a gas pipeline through Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan; the Eurasian Land Bridge—developing land transport through Mongolia, Kazakhstan, and Russia; and major railway lines like the China-Central Asia-West Asia Corridor connecting China to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan.

While Russia affirmed in May 2015 that the BRI is compatible with the EEU’s agenda and aims, Russia may see things differently down the line. It is likely that China’s massive presence in Central Asia rankles even now, but Moscow has demurred simply because its position is not strong enough to push back on China in this geopolitically sensitive area. In the future, an emboldened Russia may express its disapproval of China’s engagement in these former Soviet Republics and this could become a strain on Russian-Chinese relations. This dynamic existed with Europe in 1990s when Russia acquiesced to EU expansion into Eastern Europe and the Baltic states. Years later, Russia expressed opposition to the loss of influence in its traditional sphere of influence, prompting the conflict in Ukraine. In other words, like the delayed objection to the expansion of European trade and military cooperation with countries formerly part of the Soviet bloc, Russia in the future may take a similar opposing stance to Chinese investment and trade dominance in Central Asia. Once again, this region includes not only Russian allies but also former Soviet republics, and Chinese engagement in Central Asia may become seen as dismissive of Russian interests. 

For now, the time is ripe for a Sino-Russian rapprochement. Both Russia and China share a desire to push back on a unipolar, U.S.-dominated world order. Both have demonstrated a growing desire to project power in their neighborhoods and beyond, and both are asserting their strength after a period of weakness.[1] In Russia, Putin has gained popularity and legitimacy at home by defending Russian interests in the near abroad, thwarting U.S. foreign policy aims, and becoming a key actor in various conflicts around the world, such as in Iran, North Korea, Venezuela, and Syria. In a similar vein, under Xi, China has sought to project more power abroad and augment China’s global prestige. Not only has China increased its investment in the military, it has used economic statecraft employing its vast savings to grow the country’s influence in multiple continents and its reach through the creation of new institutions like the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank. Despite early interpretations that Chinese lending would have no strings attached, it is now clearer that Chinese loans require deference to its “One China” policy and other priorities. Countries that deviate from this are not eligible for investment. Moreover, China has been more assertive in its foreign policy, especially in the South China Sea where its artificial islands allow it to claim more maritime and navigation rights.

Finally, there are important shared interests and norms that are not waning but strengthening. The leaders of China and Russia approach governance at home similarly. Both have relied upon heightened use of coercion and both favor the strong centralization of power. They are highly sensitive to political succession and internal threats. Despite the potential for new challenges, Putin and Xi’s personal relationship is likely to deepen, not diminish in the near future, given their shared values, interests, and experiences,[2] and common external constraints. These shared values are becoming more significant as both countries cope with continued deteriorating relations with the United States. In March 2019 the United States extended the existing sanctions regime begun in 2015 targeting over 700 individuals and companies following Russia’s actions in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, Russian interference in the U.S. presidential elections, and the poisoning of a former Russian spy in Great Britain. The deterioration in US-China relations is more recent, but it is as substantial as it is sudden. In 2018, the Trump administration imposed tariffs on $50 billion worth of Chinese goods entering the United States, extending them in May 2019 on another $200 billion worth of goods. China has responded with tariffs on $110 billion worth of U.S. goods.

As the strategic competition between the United States and China intensifies, we should look for additional areas of cooperation and expect new photo ops of presidents Xi and Putin, making sure no one misses the ability of China and Russia to profit from a warming relationship as the United States continues to pull away from them both.

Hilary Appel is the Podlich Family Professor of Government and George R. Roberts Fellow at Claremont McKenna College.

[PDF]


[1] Both oppose American extension of missile defense capabilities, such as the deployment of THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) weapon system in Japan and South Korea and the radar system and defense shield in Central Europe. See Elizabeth Wishnick, “The Sino-Russian Partnership and the East Asian Order,” Asian Perspective, 42, 2018, pp. 355-386.

[2] Note that Putin was born in 1952 and Xi in 1953. Putin joined the KGB in 1975 and Xi joined the Communist Party in 1974.

Homepage image credit.

Memo #: 603
Series: 2
PDF: Pepm603_Appel_July2019.pdf
Related Topics
  • 2019
  • Appel
  • China
  • Russia
Previous Article
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

Peyrouse on the EU’s New Central Asia Strategy | What are Europe’s main interests in Central Asia

  • July 18, 2019
  • PONARS Eurasia
View
Next Article
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

Russian-Backed Luhansk Authorities Enlist Help of Local Cossacks

  • July 22, 2019
  • Richard Arnold
View
You May Also Like
View
  • Policy Memos | Аналитика

Exodus: Russian Repression and Social “Movement”

  • Laura Henry, Valerie Sperling and Lisa Sundstrom
  • March 24, 2023
View
  • Policy Memos | Аналитика

The Ukrainian Resistance Movement in the Occupied Territories

  • Yuriy Matsiyevsky
  • March 20, 2023
View
  • Policy Memos | Аналитика

Using Russian Prisoners to Fight in Ukraine: Legal or Illegal?

  • Alexander N. Sukharenko
  • March 14, 2023
View
  • Policy Memos | Аналитика

Ramzan Kadyrov’s Gamble in Ukraine: Keeping Chechnya Under Control While Competing for Federal Power

  • Jean-François Ratelle
  • March 13, 2023
View
  • Policy Memos | Аналитика

The Risk of Protest Won’t Stop Election Manipulation: Implications for Democracy Assistance

  • Cole Harvey
  • March 6, 2023
View
  • Policy Memos | Аналитика

Ukraine’s Current Counterintelligence Capabilities

  • Eli C. Kaul
  • March 1, 2023
View
  • Policy Memos | Аналитика

The Evolving Concerns of Russians After the Invasion of Ukraine: Evaluating Appeals to the Presidential Administration

  • Sasha de Vogel
  • February 27, 2023
View
  • Policy Memos | Аналитика

Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine and Weaponization of the “Humanitarian Space”

  • Lance Davies
  • February 24, 2023
PONARS Eurasia
  • About
  • Membership
  • Policy Memos
  • Recommended
  • Events
Powered by narva.io

Permissions & Citation Guidelines

Input your search keywords and press Enter.