As foreseen by many observers, the fall of Baghdad to U.S. forces on April 9, 2003, was just the beginning, not the end of the story. In postwar Iraq, the United States faces continuing resistance in the form of what Gen. John Abizaid (commander, U.S. Central Command) called “classic guerrilla war.” It is not surprising that the postwar stage emerging for the United States and its partners is no less expensive, deadly, and problematic than the military stage, stretching the occupying forces thin and increasing the cost of the postwar presence up to one billion U.S. dollars per week. The apparent intention of the United States to retain the overall command and control over any stabilization presence in Iraq, while internationalizing it by getting help from those states willing to provide cannon fodder and financial aid, is also not surprising. […]
Memo #:
322
Series:
1
PDF:
PDF URL:
http://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/ponars/pm_0322.pdf
Lead Researcher, Department of International Politics; Head, Peace and Conflict Studies
Affiliation
Institute of World Economy & International Relations (IMEMO), Moscow
Links
Expertise
Armed Conflicts, Insurgencies, Terrorism, Violent Networks, Political Economy of Conflicts, Violence and Ideology, Peacebuilding
