(Cambridge University Press) Troitskiy’s chapter, “When is ‘Enough’ Enough? Uncertainty in Negotiation,” in William Zartman’s edited volume How Negotiations End, looks at the Gorbachev/Kohl/Baker 1990 “NATO non-enlargement” negotiations, the Minsk agreements on eastern Ukraine, and the Iran nuclear deal as cases of “constructively ambiguous” compromises.
Preview: This chapter anaylyses the positive role in ambiguity in the closing phase of negotiations. For our purposes here, ambiguity means the lack of clairty about the meaning of an important aspect fo negotiated agreement – whether substantive or procedural. The argument is that sometimes ambiguity in the negotiated deal does not prevent a construtive closure of negotiations. On the contrary, it can be conducive to closure and form the basis for a viable solution to the negotiatied problem. […]
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