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On November 14, 2024, Qazaqstani authorities arrested Perizat Kairat, the founder and head of the foundation Biz Birgemiz Qazaqstan (“We Are Together Qazaqstan”), who was accused of embezzling KZT1.5 billion (approximately $300 million) from donations collected to aid Qazaqstanis affected by the March–April 2024 floods. The backstory is that Kairat, in April 2024, had published (and later deleted) an Instagram post criticizing the government for its response to the natural disaster.
Indeed, the floods, which affected 10 regions and hundreds of thousands of people, were classified as a “national emergency.” President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev called them “perhaps… the biggest disaster in terms of scale and consequences in the last 80 years.” As they played out, the national government tried to diffuse blame and project an image of competence. Yet the scale of the floods, along with the public attention they generated, revealed vulnerabilities in Qazaqstani governance, including underinvestment in preparedness and a lack of accountability. In this memo, we argue that this suggests the need for policy improvements on the national and local levels.
Spring 2024 Floods in Qazaqstan
Floods constitute the most common natural disaster in Central Asian countries: According to data from the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, out of 144 natural disasters recorded in 2000–2023, 51 (35%) were floods, followed by earthquakes (23) and hydrological events (20; “when heavy rain or rapid snow/ice melt send large amounts of vegetation, mud, or rock down a slope driven by gravitational forces”). In Qazaqstan, for the same period, 13 floods occurred, overall affecting 154,547 residents and accounting for $344.5 million in damage (adjusted for PPP). The deluge in spring 2024 was on a much larger scale, however: More than 120,000 residents were evacuated (see Figure 1) and 17,603 buildings were destroyed, with the total damage reaching over KZT53 billion ($100.6 million). The floods damaged the national electricity grid, roads, and social infrastructure (e.g., schools and hospitals). Densely populated urban areas like Uralsk, Petropavl, and Aktobe were battered as residents posted videos of real-life scenes that recalled the movie Interstellar. In Atyrau Region, the floods lasted until late May; a dam near the village of Zhalgansai broke, and 200 residents had to be evacuated.
Figure 1. Estimated annual number of residents affected by floods in Qazaqstan
Source: EM-DAT
The spring 2024 floods sparked a national discussion on whom to blame. In hindsight, it was the combination of three key factors that caused the unprecedented destruction and hardship: record water levels, underinvestment in water infrastructure, and problems in intragovernmental coordination.
First, heavy snow- and rainfall in winter 2023/2024 combined with changing seasonal melting patterns to create the initial conditions for flooding. The heavy precipitation (twice that of the previous winter) not only raised water levels but also lowered the soil’s capacity to absorb excess water. As a result, water levels in transboundary rivers (such us the Irtysh, Tobol, Ural, and Ishim [Esil]) reached their highest in 30 years.
Second, the floods revealed multiple infrastructure deficiencies. An official Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation assessment established that 537 hydraulic structures in the country require repair, out of which 322 units were said to pose a threat to a total of 1.5 million Qazaqstanis in the event of a potential rupture. Key reservoirs and dams are old and require major upgrades: For example, the Sergeyev reservoir in North Qazaqstan Region, upstream from Petropavl, a major urban hub that was severely affected by the 2024 floods, was built in 1968. Some experts directly accused the authorities of mismanaging water infrastructure: Kuralay Yahiyaeva, the head of Country Water Partnership-Qazaqstan, stated that “Akimats allowed the infrastructure to deteriorate, which led to ruptures. Some structures were leased or sold, and as a result, they were not properly prepared [for the floods].” Other projects that would have helped to manage water resources—like the Buzuluk reservoir—have been postponed.
Third, intragovernmental coordination was lacking. Starting in December 2023, Kazhydromet, the state agency in charge of meteorological monitoring and forecasting, had been warning regional authorities of imminent floods. The head of the agency has testified that information about a high risk of floods was communicated to akimats (local administrations), and Kazhydromet issued over 100 weather warnings from early March. The emergency situations minister, Chingis Arinov, as early as the beginning of February 2024, warned that “acute” floods were to be expected but claimed that necessary preparations had been made and protocols were in place. These warnings and preparations proved insufficient, however: Tokayev later criticized Kazhydromet and Kazvodkhoz (the state water management agency) for not having enough analytical and forecast capacity and lambasted the national government and regional akimats for “negligence and lack of professionalism,” citing a lack of coordination between national and subnational authorities.
Overall, the unprecedented precipitation in 2023–2024 is only partially to blame for the damage caused by the spring 2024 floods—in fact, scholars had long warned of “changing climate change-induced shifts in river runoff” in the region. The authorities were caught off guard, having allowed infrastructure to deteriorate and having failed to set up necessary coordination.
Government and Public Responses
On February 20, 2024, Arinov reported that 39,000 men and 11,000 pieces of equipment were ready to respond to the expected floods. Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov reacted by cautioning that “[Our] readiness remains only on paper.” As the actual events unfolded, this sentiment was reiterated by the president: On March 20, 2024, during a meeting with officials, Tokayev reprimanded First Deputy Prime Minister Roman Sklyar, Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation Nurzhan Nurzhigitov, and the akims (heads) of Atyrau, Akmola, Almaty, Pavlodar, and Abai regions. In addition, the mayor of Uralsk, one of the cities hardest hit by the floods, Mirzhan Satkanov was reprimanded and later resigned. The akims of Aktobe, Kostanay and West Kazakhstan regions were called out, as well.
The national government allocated over KZT7 billion ($15.2 million) for flood prevention and clean-up, which proved to be insufficient. A few regions announced measures to control flooding: For example, in 2023, in Karaganda Region, a local waterway was deepened, while in Aktobe Region, 17 flood control projects worth KZT1.1 billion (about $2.4 million) were completed. However, these measures were admittedly inadequate: In the latter case, the regional akim claimed that another KZT11 billion (10 times the amount spent in 2023) was necessary to implement the flood control measures in full. Regions lacked essential equipment such as boats, water shoes, and sandbags. As a result, evacuations were delayed and, in some areas, people had to spend the night on top of dams with their children. In one village that went completely underwater, the evacuation bus overturned, while the motor of a rescue boat broke down.
As the floods intensified, the national government stepped in: After tongue-lashing by Tokayev, a national headquarters was established to coordinate relief and recovery efforts. Headed by Bektenov, it included heads of national and local agencies, representatives of the Presidential Administration, and regional akimats. The government pledged KZT12.6 billion ($27.4 million) in one-time payments for flood victims and another KZT10.0 billion ($21.7 million) in material compensation, in addition to KZT916 million ($2.0 million) in compensation for livestock losses (about 8,000 farm animals were killed by the floods). However, this relief was delayed because of red tape, despite calls by national-level officials for flexibility. For example, to receive compensation for livestock, people needed to present the carcass of the dead animal with the ear tag.
Reconstruction required even more resources: In June 2024, Bektenov reported 18,005 houses had sustained damaged, with about half (8,500) deemed impossible to restore. Some regions saw delays in reconstruction: In one Aktobe Region village, reconstruction stopped because of a contractor’s financial problems. Meanwhile, even though additional money was poured into fixing local road networks, some areas were still inaccessible by land 5–6 months after the floods. In sum, relief and recovery measures helped mitigate some of the immediate impact of the floods, but systemic issues like bureaucratic inefficiency and poor preparedness substantially hindered these efforts.
Figure 2. Mentions of “floods” by Kazinform news agency, 2011–2024
Source: Kazinform
The floods attracted enormous public attention. In 2024, the news agency Kazinform mentioned the word “pavodki” (“floods”) 76 times—roughly equal to the total number of mentions in 2011–2023 (82 times total; see Figure 2). In early February 2024, MediaNet, in cooperation with the Paperlab Research Center, conducted a survey about disaster preparedness in Qazaqstan (note: the authors have the primary data with weights and have recalculated the following percentages), where half of respondents expressed concern about emergency situations in the country, while 39.6% said the work of officials to prepare for them was unsatisfactory. As to who bears the greatest responsibility for ensuring the safety of the population during emergency situations, 11.9% said the president and the government, 13.9% said people themselves, and 18.7% said “local authorities and specialized services.” The majority (52.5%), however, responded that all of them are equally responsible. About every second respondent (47.6%) thought toughened punishment for corruption and negligence would help remedy the problems. This response was second only to “raising public awareness and conducting regular training” (52.5%; note that respondents could pick more than one answer). Overall, the public seems to be aware of where things are breaking down, yet people struggle to identify whom is to blame. As in Russia, by diffusing responsibility, the national-level authorities avoid blame and preempt collective action. Still, this strategy has its natural limits.
Conclusion
The spring 2024 floods brought to the surface old vulnerabilities of Qazaqstani governance: decades of neglected investments in infrastructure and preparedness measures, as well as a lack of autonomy and resources on the local level. Political leaders in the country are well aware of the possible political fallout from failing to protect the population—floods are just the tip of the iceberg. Tokayev portrays himself as the competent leader of a competent administration: In his interview to the newspaper Ana tili (“Mother Tongue”) on January 3, 2025, the president praised officials for their efficiency and diligence and stated, “Severe consequences could have been avoided if due attention had been paid to the construction of protective dams and other hydraulic structures in recent decades.” He also pledged further investment in water management and capacity to forecast and prevent natural disasters.
With climate change, however, floods are likely to get worse, meaning even more money will need to be invested in preparedness. What is more important is for the government to recognize that there is “no such thing as natural disaster”—as the late geographer and anthropologist Neil Smith put it, “The contours of disaster and the difference between who lives and who dies is to a greater or lesser extent a social calculus.” For Qazaqstan, political reforms that might improve accountability on the national and local levels (e.g., free and competitive elections and media freedoms) are essential to responding to natural disasters adequately and in a timely manner. The national-level authorities, it seems, have been keen to avoid taking responsibility for the handling of multiple crises, instead continuing to try to project competence. Nonetheless, a significant portion of the population is dissatisfied with how natural disasters are handled (especially in regions like Atyrau, Ulytau, and West Qazaqstan, which are prone to floods), even prior to the 2024 floods, and addressing these grievances requires not only infrastructure modernization but also political reforms.
Andrei Semenov is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Nazarbayev University.
Aizat Inussova is an undergraduate student in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Nazarbayev University.
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