PONARS Eurasia
  • About
    • Contact
    • Membership
      • All Members
      • Core Members
      • Collegium Members
      • Associate Members
      • About Membership
    • Ukraine Experts
    • Executive Committee
  • Policy Memos
    • List of Policy Memos
    • Submissions
  • Podcasts
  • Online Academy
  • Events
    • Past Events
  • Recommended
  • Task Forces
    • Ukraine
    • Amplifying Voices of Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia (AVECCA)
  • Ukraine Experts
Contacts

Address
1957 E St NW,
Washington, DC 20052

adminponars@gwu.edu
202.994.5915

NEWSLETTER
Facebook
Twitter
YouTube
Podcast
PONARS Eurasia
PONARS Eurasia
  • About
    • Contact
    • Membership
      • All Members
      • Core Members
      • Collegium Members
      • Associate Members
      • About Membership
    • Ukraine Experts
    • Executive Committee
  • Policy Memos
    • List of Policy Memos
    • Submissions
  • Podcasts
  • Online Academy
  • Events
    • Past Events
  • Recommended
  • Task Forces
    • Ukraine
    • Amplifying Voices of Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia (AVECCA)
  • Ukraine Experts
DIGITAL RESOURCES
digital resources

Bookstore 📚

Knowledge Hub

Course Syllabi

Point & Counterpoint

Policy Perspectives

RECOMMENDED
  • Clearing the Air: Secretary Blinken Visits Ukraine

    View
  • Ukraine Task Force: Getting Ukraine Right: From Negotiations Trap to Victory

    View
  • Ensuring Genuine Results? A New Electoral Design in Uzbekistan

    View
  • Ukraine, Taiwan, and Macron’s “Strategic Autonomy”

    View
  • After Violence: Russia’s Beslan School Massacre and the Peace that Followed

    View
RSS PONARS Eurasia Podcast
  • The Putin-Xi Summit: What's New In Their Joint Communique ? February 23, 2022
    In this week’s PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman speaks with Russian China experts Vita Spivak and Alexander Gabuev about the February meeting between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, and what it may tell us about where the Russian-Chinese relationship is headed.
  • Exploring the Russian Courts' Ruling to Liquidate the Memorial Society January 28, 2022
    In this week’s PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with scholars Kelly Smith and Benjamin Nathans about the history, achievements, and impending shutdown of the Memorial Society, Russia's oldest and most venerable civic organization, and what its imminent liquidation portends for the Russian civil society.
  • Russia's 2021 census and the Kremlin's nationalities policy [Lipman Series 2021] December 9, 2021
    In this week’s PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with social scientist Andrey Shcherbak about the quality of the data collected in the recent population census and the goals of Vladimir Putin's government's nationalities policy
  • Active citizens of any kind are under threat [Lipman Series 2021] November 5, 2021
    In this week’s PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with Alexander Verkhovsky about the Kremlin's ever expanding toolkit against political and civic activists, journalists, and other dissidents.
  • Russia's Legislative Elections followup [Lipman Series 2021] October 4, 2021
    In this week’s PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with Tanya Lokot and Nikolay Petrov about the results of Russia’s legislative elections and about what comes next.
  • Why Is the Kremlin Nervous? [Lipman Series 2021] September 14, 2021
    In this week’s PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with Ben Noble and Nikolay Petrov about Russia’s September 17-19 legislative elections, repressive measures against electoral challengers, and whether to expect anything other than preordained results.
  • Vaccine Hesitancy in Russia, France, and the United States [Lipman Series 2021] August 31, 2021
    In this week's PONARS Eurasia Podcast episode, Maria Lipman chats with Denis Volkov, Naira Davlashyan, and Peter Slevin about why COVID-19 vaccination rates are still so low across the globe, comparing vaccine hesitant constituencies across Russia, France, and the United States.  
  • Is Russia Becoming More Soviet? [Lipman Series 2021] July 26, 2021
      In a new PONARS Eurasia Podcast episode, Maria Lipman chats with Maxim Trudolyubov about the current tightening of the Russian political sphere, asking whether or not it’s helpful to draw comparisons to the late Soviet period.
  • The Evolution of Russia's Political Regime [Lipman Series 2021] June 21, 2021
    In this week's episode of the PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with Grigory Golosov and Henry Hale about the evolution of Russia's political regime, and what to expect in the lead-up to September's Duma elections.
  • Volodymyr Zelensky: Year Two [Lipman Series 2021] May 24, 2021
    In this week's episode of the PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with Sergiy Kudelia and Georgiy Kasianov about Ukrainian President Zelensky's second year in office, and how he has handled the political turbulence of the past year.
  • Commentary | Комментарии
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

Clearing the Air: Secretary Blinken Visits Ukraine

  • September 19, 2023
  • Volodymyr Dubovyk

Image license/credit

Secretary Blinken’s recent visit to Ukraine stands out in a number of ways. Blinken had not been in Ukraine for exactly a year, since September 8, 2022. This is quite a long time considering the level of engagement between Kyiv and Washington since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion against Ukraine in February 2022. Indeed, this engagement has been enormous and totally unprecedented—not just in the context of U.S.-Ukraine relations, but in U.S. international politics in general, especially since the end of the Cold War.

Perhaps there was a sense in Washington that there had been too long a gap between high-level visits. Of course, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy went to Washington late last year, and U.S. President Joe Biden was himself in Kyiv briefly in February of this year. Such a frequency of visits would be considered high in normal times, but these times are anything but normal, and the U.S.’s role, stakes, and interests with regard to Russia-Ukraine are colossal.

It is no secret that there has been some friction between the partners on a number of issues, but particularly with regard to the ongoing Ukrainian offensive, which aims to dislodge the Russian occupiers from Ukrainian lands. The experience of 2022 was close to stellar. The American military apparently worked closely with its Ukrainian counterpart in advising on the operations, resulting, among other things, in the successful liberation of a huge swath of land in Kharkiv region and also of the city of Kherson. The Russian military was not quite ready for this. Now, in 2023, things are different in the sense that Russian troops have used their time to prepare for the Ukrainian offensive to the maximum.

The task before the Ukrainian military is truly a gargantuan one. The U.S. military and those of Ukraine’s other partners trained many thousands of Ukrainian troops in preparation for the ongoing offensive. Yet once the offensive began, disagreements surfaced on issues like strategy/tactics, the direction of the strike, and the pace. In terms of strategy, Ukraine’s Western counterparts insisted on so-called combined arms operations. They also thought that Ukraine should throw everything it has in one direction, namely trying to cut the so-called “land corridor” between Donbas and Crimea. But the Ukrainian command, presumably not of their own will, opted for small, incremental steps instead.

As the offensive unfolded, too many anonymous sources in Washington began to be quoted as criticizing Ukraine for conducting the offensive in a way they perceived as wrong. This was received quite poorly in Ukraine, particularly among the Ukrainian political leadership. One of the most frequent counterarguments among Ukrainians has been that Kyiv cannot carry out a combined arms operation because it does not have all the arms elements—specifically air support—in place.

The mood in Ukraine has become more somber. This is due not solely to the slow pace of the offensive and the high number of casualties, even though this has caused a significant part of the gloom, but also to the belief that Ukraine’s partners have not provided sufficient arms to Ukraine, yet criticize it for not succeeding with the offensive. It must be noted that there is a delicate balance between Ukraine’s gratitude for Western (specifically U.S.) assistance, on one hand, and frustration with the West’s presumed timidity, ineptitude, and unwillingness to embrace Ukraine’s victory as the ultimate endgame, on the other. In the weeks prior to Blinken’s visit, that balance tilted toward the latter.

This seeming rift needed to be reversed. Optics matter, especially in times like these. Certainly, major decisions can be made without high-level visits. But visits have a quality of reassuring people—on both sides of the Atlantic, but also throughout the pro-Ukraine coalition of countries, in which the US plays a special role. For other allies, it is important to see that the US continues to carry the torch as the main actor and coordinator/facilitator of the pro-Ukraine coalition.

Speaking of that special role, perhaps there was a feeling in Washington that others in the coalition were “stealing the show,” capturing initiative away from the US. With longer-range missiles, these actors were the British and then the French. With F-16s, the recent moves by the Netherlands and Denmark, later joined by Norway, caught attention. By comparison, Washington looked like it was dragging its feet. This was not necessarily a good look—to be “leading from behind.” So it made sense for Secretary Blinken to go to Kyiv and announce a new assistance package, reminding everyone that the US is still very much in the driver’s seat. The visit might also have hinted that the issue of the longer-strike-range ATACMS missiles being delivered to Ukraine might be resolved positively soon.

Sending a message to Moscow has always been an important aspect of these visits, as has demonstrating American staying power and showing that the US is not going away. Blinken staying in Kyiv for two days, including one night—a first for a high-level U.S. official during the war—was a big deal. This was a sign of resilience and confidence of sorts, especially in the face of Moscow’s effort to show that they are not leaving occupied Ukrainian lands, even orchestrating so-called “elections” there the other day.

Finally, Blinken perhaps wanted to touch base with Zelenskyy and his team on a number of delicate issues, some of which necessitated sitting down and looking your counterpart in the eye. These include the issue of elections in Ukraine, both local/parliamentary and presidential. Should they take place under the current martial law and circumstances of total war or not?

That is a big question. And there is no consensus on it on either side of the Atlantic. How would it look for the image of Ukraine as a resilient democracy if these elections did not take place on time or were delayed indefinitely? But could you realistically conduct them at a time when all of Ukraine is being targeted by Russian strikes? If a decision is to be made on the rapidly approaching elections, Kyiv and Washington had better appear on the same side.

An even touchier issue: Is Ukraine ready for some sort of communication with Moscow on a possible ceasefire? What would this take? What sort of arrangement could there be? Despite its large-scale assistance to Ukraine, including, of course, lots of weapons, Washington has always had one eye on a diplomatic track, trying to see when and how non-military levers can come into play, and be ready for this moment. All in all, this visit was a positive development for the Ukraine-U.S. strategic partnership. It helped to smooth some differences and laid the foundation for further cooperation in the coming months and years.

Volodymyr Dubovyk is an Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations and
Director of the Center for International Studies at Odesa I. I. Mechnikov National University
(Ukraine).

Image license/credit

Related Topics
  • U.S.-Ukrainian Relations
  • Ukraine
Previous Article
  • Policy Memos | Аналитика

Explaining Ukraine’s Resilience to Russia’s Invasion: The Role of Local Governance and Decentralization Reform

  • September 11, 2023
  • Andrii Darkovich, Myroslava Savisko and Maryna Rabinovych
View
You May Also Like
View
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

Ukraine Task Force: Getting Ukraine Right: From Negotiations Trap to Victory

  • PONARS Eurasia
  • May 25, 2023
View
  • Commentary | Комментарии
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

Ensuring Genuine Results? A New Electoral Design in Uzbekistan

  • Akrom Avezov
  • May 19, 2023
View
  • Commentary | Комментарии
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

Ukraine, Taiwan, and Macron’s “Strategic Autonomy”

  • Maurizio Delli Santi
  • April 30, 2023
View
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

After Violence: Russia’s Beslan School Massacre and the Peace that Followed

  • Debra Javeline
  • April 24, 2023
View
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

Ukraine’s Unnamed War: Before the Russian Invasion of 2022

  • Dominique Arel and Jesse Driscoll
  • April 15, 2023
View
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

A Rock and a Hard Place: The Russian Opposition in a Time of War | New Voices on Eurasia with Jeremy Ladd (April 11)

  • PONARS Eurasia
  • April 9, 2023
View
  • Commentary | Комментарии
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

Russia’s Regional Governors: Backing the War, Upholding the Status Quo

  • Irina Busygina and Mikhail Filippov
  • April 7, 2023
View
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

Opinion | Why Do Russians Still Want to Fight?

  • Marlene Laruelle and Ivan Grek
  • March 31, 2023
PONARS Eurasia
  • About
  • Membership
  • Policy Memos
  • Recommended
  • Events
Powered by narva.io

Permissions & Citation Guidelines

Input your search keywords and press Enter.