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  • Commentary | Комментарии

Belarus: Back to Basics

  • December 21, 2010
  • PONARS Eurasia

 

by Vitali Silitski Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies The Belarus presidential election developed under a carnival atmosphere—the major news of the campaign was a kitten brutally murdered by a candidate about sixty years ago—and yet, the show ended in a tragic blood bash. Pressured by Russia and anxious to normalize relations with the EU, President Alexander Lukashenka allowed an unprecedented degree of freedom for the opposition to register (10 candidates ran for election), campaign, deliver messages on television, debate, and criticize. At stake was over $3 billion in technical assistance promised by the EU if the vote was clean. We saw Lukashenka on TV promising the cleanest vote and offering the German foreign minister to stay and count votes if he wished. What we could not see, however, was how much physical and mental discomfort this freedom game cost Lukashenka. The violent crackdown…[continued below]


Recommendations for the EU:

  1. Declare all those arrested on December 19 political prisoners and call for their immediate release.
  2. Suggest a “zero solution” to Lukashenka: declare a readiness to resume political dialogue and follow all other formal and informal agreements contingent upon the release of all prisoners and the abstention of the government from new repressive acts against individuals, parties, NGOs, and media for a period of no less than three months.
  3. Demand an independent, international investigation of the December 19 events.
  4. Declare solidarity and offer help to those who suffered from beatings, arrests, and other repressive acts, and to their families.


The violent crackdown on the post-election protesters in Minsk on December 19, 2010, came as a symbolic “closing” of liberalization that Belarus enjoyed since 2008. Independent accounts provide sufficient information that the violence used by the riot police—arresting and beating hundreds of people—was orchestrated by the security forces. Lukashenka publicly declared his responsibility for treating protesters in a brutal manner and declared the end of “senseless democracy,” conspicuously showing his indifference to “your European structures” on Euronews. Lukashenka’s actions were a choice, not necessity. The regime decided to undo the results of the lengthy and elaborate “façade of democratization” it had built over the preceding several months, even as an “elegant victory” with minimal violence and only modest election rigging—enough for the EU to call it significant political progress and to boost a dialogue—was at hand minutes before polls closed and people began assembling on the streets. The exit polls sponsored by the authorities announced 72% voted for Lukashenka—a number the EU could easily swallow. But the regime obviously failed to withstand the challenge of its own liberalization efforts as it came to understand that sustaining a relatively free society would bring forth the loss of political control much sooner than either the regime or observers could have expected. All of a sudden, society woke up and many began to be politically active. Electoral commissions “misread,” in Lukashenka’s word, his policies, and were too afraid to rig the votes. And police argued with riot police on the streets over whether to crack down on the protesters. Facing small but remarkable signs of disorder in the repressive apparatus, he consciously chose repressive stability over whatever benefits liberalization and openness to Europe could bring. Judging by the actions, it can be firmly concluded that the crackdown was planned well in advance and was not a spontaneous decision. For three years, the EU and civil society in Belarus tried to “drag” Lukashenka into the European orbit, hoping that closer ties to the EU would encourage internal liberalization and reform in the country. The events on December 19 and the forthcoming all-around crackdown proved that Lukashenka’s regime is not reformable by evolutionary means and can briefly only mimic a semblance of evolution. This brings Belarus back to the situation of 2005-2006, perhaps with much less hope for dialogue and engagement in hand. We need to reflect deeper on the long-term consequences and possible actions of what has happened, and also concentrate on minimizing the damage to Belarus in its slide back to its darkest day of repression. To do so, we suggest that the European Union take the following actions:

  1. Declare all those arrested on December 19 political prisoners and call for their immediate release.
  2. Suggest a “zero solution” to Lukashenka: declare a readiness to resume political dialogue and follow all other formal and informal agreements contingent upon the release of all prisoners and the abstention of the government from new repressive acts against individuals, parties, NGOs, and media for a period of no less than three months.
  3. Demand an independent, international investigation of the December 19 events.
  4. Declare solidarity and offer help to those who suffered from beatings, arrests, and other repressive acts, and to their families.

Secondary Author:
Vitali Silitski
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