PONARS Eurasia
  • About
    • Contact
    • Membership
      • All Members
      • Core Members
      • Collegium Members
      • Associate Members
      • About Membership
    • Ukraine Experts
    • Executive Committee
  • Policy Memos
    • List of Policy Memos
    • Submissions
  • Podcasts
  • Online Academy
  • Events
    • Past Events
  • Recommended
  • Ukraine Experts
Contacts

Address
1957 E St NW,
Washington, DC 20052

adminponars@gwu.edu
202.994.5915

NEWSLETTER
Facebook
Twitter
YouTube
Podcast
PONARS Eurasia
PONARS Eurasia
  • About
    • Contact
    • Membership
      • All Members
      • Core Members
      • Collegium Members
      • Associate Members
      • About Membership
    • Ukraine Experts
    • Executive Committee
  • Policy Memos
    • List of Policy Memos
    • Submissions
  • Podcasts
  • Online Academy
  • Events
    • Past Events
  • Recommended
  • Ukraine Experts
DIGITAL RESOURCES
digital resources

Bookstore 📚

Knowledge Hub

Course Syllabi

Point & Counterpoint

Policy Perspectives

RECOMMENDED
  • The Russia Program at GW (IERES)

    View
  • The Evolving Concerns of Russians after the Invasion | New Voices on Eurasia with Sasha de Vogel (March 9)

    View
  • PONARS Eurasia Spring Policy Conference (March 3)

    View
  • Ukrainathon 2023 (Feb. 24-25)

    View
  • How Putin has shrugged off unprecedented economic sanctions over Russia’s war in Ukraine – for now

    View
RSS PONARS Eurasia Podcast
  • The Putin-Xi Summit: What's New In Their Joint Communique ? February 23, 2022
    In this week’s PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman speaks with Russian China experts Vita Spivak and Alexander Gabuev about the February meeting between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, and what it may tell us about where the Russian-Chinese relationship is headed.
  • Exploring the Russian Courts' Ruling to Liquidate the Memorial Society January 28, 2022
    In this week’s PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with scholars Kelly Smith and Benjamin Nathans about the history, achievements, and impending shutdown of the Memorial Society, Russia's oldest and most venerable civic organization, and what its imminent liquidation portends for the Russian civil society.
  • Russia's 2021 census and the Kremlin's nationalities policy [Lipman Series 2021] December 9, 2021
    In this week’s PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with social scientist Andrey Shcherbak about the quality of the data collected in the recent population census and the goals of Vladimir Putin's government's nationalities policy
  • Active citizens of any kind are under threat [Lipman Series 2021] November 5, 2021
    In this week’s PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with Alexander Verkhovsky about the Kremlin's ever expanding toolkit against political and civic activists, journalists, and other dissidents.
  • Russia's Legislative Elections followup [Lipman Series 2021] October 4, 2021
    In this week’s PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with Tanya Lokot and Nikolay Petrov about the results of Russia’s legislative elections and about what comes next.
  • Why Is the Kremlin Nervous? [Lipman Series 2021] September 14, 2021
    In this week’s PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with Ben Noble and Nikolay Petrov about Russia’s September 17-19 legislative elections, repressive measures against electoral challengers, and whether to expect anything other than preordained results.
  • Vaccine Hesitancy in Russia, France, and the United States [Lipman Series 2021] August 31, 2021
    In this week's PONARS Eurasia Podcast episode, Maria Lipman chats with Denis Volkov, Naira Davlashyan, and Peter Slevin about why COVID-19 vaccination rates are still so low across the globe, comparing vaccine hesitant constituencies across Russia, France, and the United States.  
  • Is Russia Becoming More Soviet? [Lipman Series 2021] July 26, 2021
      In a new PONARS Eurasia Podcast episode, Maria Lipman chats with Maxim Trudolyubov about the current tightening of the Russian political sphere, asking whether or not it’s helpful to draw comparisons to the late Soviet period.
  • The Evolution of Russia's Political Regime [Lipman Series 2021] June 21, 2021
    In this week's episode of the PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with Grigory Golosov and Henry Hale about the evolution of Russia's political regime, and what to expect in the lead-up to September's Duma elections.
  • Volodymyr Zelensky: Year Two [Lipman Series 2021] May 24, 2021
    In this week's episode of the PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with Sergiy Kudelia and Georgiy Kasianov about Ukrainian President Zelensky's second year in office, and how he has handled the political turbulence of the past year.
  • Commentary | Комментарии

Should the United States Provide Military Assistance to Ukraine? PONARS Eurasia Experts Weigh In

  • February 6, 2015
  • PONARS Eurasia

A group of former senior military and diplomatic officials have called for the United States to provide $1 billion a year in military assistance to Ukraine over the next three years (see their report here). This would be primarily for non-lethal items but also allow for the provision of weaponry such as light anti-armor missiles. Should Washington take their advice?

Volodymyr Dubovyk, Mechnikov National University (Odessa):

I believe that Washington should take their advice. So far, Moscow has sensed weakness in the West's position. Sanctions are working, perhaps, but not biting enough or quickly enough, so something else is needed to try and alter the Russian onslaught on Ukraine. Receiving some of these weapons would surely increase the cost of further Russian intervention in Ukraine. This is not about Ukraine winning a war against Russia but about preventing Ukraine losing its agency and integrity, and salvaging Ukraine's independence. So far, the road toward escalation was via talks and statements. That is exactly what Moscow expects from the West. The time has come for a new set of actions.

Sergiy Kudelia, Baylor University (Texas):

The provision of limited defensive weaponry to Ukraine should be strictly conditional on the agreement of Ukrainian authorities to launch official talks with the insurgents on settling the conflict. It should also be done only in conjunction with the creation of a humanitarian fund to provide medical and food supplies to civilians in the Donbas. By itself, "lethal aid" from the United States is only likely to prolong the conflict, increase the intensity of fighting, and reinforce the anti-American narrative presenting the war as the result of U.S. scheming. Any new ceasefire deal will not hold as long as there are no follow-up negotiations with the insurgent forces on a comprehensive peace agreement. If the goal of the U.S. government is to achieve a lasting peace in eastern Ukraine, it should use its leverage to compel the Ukrainian government to agree to the partitioning of the Donbas. The United States should also use its diplomatic experience from resolving secessionist conflicts to advise the Ukrainian side on the proper institutional terms of the settlement. Finally, the United States should begin a diplomatic dialogue with Russia to facilitate multilateral negotiations regarding the final status of breakaway territories in the Donbas with the promise of lifting sanctions once the implementation of the final agreement begins.

Kimberly Marten, Barnard College and Harriman Institute, Columbia University (New York):

The United States should not send weapons to Ukraine. First, Ukraine does not have a reliable and professional military, and this means the United States will have no control over how the weapons are used on the ground. They could be used to target opposing civilians by hyper-nationalist militias; they could even be used against targets in Russia by those who want to provoke a wider war. Second, the plan is based on the assumption that more weapons will deter Putin from taking further action or cause him to back down. But everything we know about Putin's personality says that when he is threatened he will fight harder. Furthermore, he cannot be seen as backing down in the face of a Western threat and still maintain the image he has carefully cultivated as a strongman. He has been preparing the ground for the possibility of open Russian military involvement in Ukraine by saying that the conflict is really NATO's attempt to threaten Russian sovereignty and security. He is most likely to ramp up the conflict, not tamp it down, if the United States sends weapons to Ukraine.

Sergey Minasyan, Caucasus Institute (Yerevan):

Of course appeasement is not an option in such a conflict. However, the main problem is that there is no guarantee there will be any further U.S. response if Russia escalates militarily, possibly even before Javelin anti-tank missiles or other American weaponry were to reach Ukraine. That is why such a step may only increase the consequences and pain of war for Ukrainians.

A strong signal from the U.S. government is not enough if there is no determination for a subsequent military step. A completely different situation exists now than, say, during the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008. Russia is more motivated and the stakes are higher; it will not be deterred only by strong signals from Washington.

If the U.S. demonstrated a clear determination to escalate military support beyond a decision to provide arms to Ukraine, that would be another matter (leaving aside the risk of direct U.S.-Russian conflict and taking into account the nuclear factor). But in its absence? The Kremlin will have the advantage, even if just a propagandistic one, of escalating in Ukraine without facing real consequences from the West.

There is already no good option for assisting Ukraine through the provision of arms. At the current stage, any direct military-technical assistance will increase the escalation spiral without actually helping the country.

Oxana Shevel, Tufts University (Boston):

Washington should seriously contemplate military assistance as part of a broader strategy for ending the conflict in Ukraine. It should not treat the option in a black-white/yes-no manner; it should take some but not all of the advice in the report. The main argument against military assistance to Ukraine is that it is more likely to encourage than discourage Russia from escalating the conflict, which would increase death and destruction, especially among civilians. These concerns are valid, but they could be mitigated by providing only the kind of equipment that would bolster Ukraine's defenses and enable it to halt the further military advances of the Russia-backed separatists.

Since the September 2014 Minsk Agreement, with generous supplies of arms, advisers, and manpower from Russia, the separatists have gradually captured about 200 square miles of territory beyond the separation line agreed to in Minsk. In recent weeks, they have abandoned the agreement altogether, escalating the situation to an all-out offensive. Further, they have openly declared their intention to capture at least all of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The separatist offensive has been slow and bloody. It is clear that the Ukrainian army, weak as it may be, is going to fight tooth and nail for every town it holds. If the separatist offensive continues, the humanitarian tragedies in towns like Vuhlehirsk and Debaltseve will be replayed across the region. A way to stop this misery from spreading is to secure a “hold” at the current line of contact. Limited Western military assistance may help the Ukrainian army do just that.

Non-lethal items such as communication equipment, reconnaissance drones, armored transport vehicles, and medical equipment may substantially bolster Ukrainian defense capabilities and help them hold the line. The West can stop short of supplying lethal items.

Escalation has costs for Russia. Russia has been eager to maintain its narrative of not being a party to the conflict. Escalation would have to involve the shipment of Russian troops and weapons that may be impossible to conceal from domestic and western audiences. Without the veneer of plausible deniability, Russia will be looking at stiffer sanctions and removal from the SWIFT system, which could deal a deathblow to the Russian economy.

Ultimately, the decision on military assistance to Ukraine should be taken as part of a broader Western strategy. This requires being honest about which Russian concerns the West is willing to address and which red lines it will not allow to be crossed.

If the West's decision on limited military aid to Ukraine came with a peace plan to Russia and Ukraine over the Donbas – possibly a plan that is more advantageous to the separatist areas than the Minsk agreement – it may avoid escalation, and, at a minimum, prevent further civilian deaths.

Nikolai Sokov, Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (Vienna):

My reading of Moscow’s intentions lately has been that it wanted to deescalate without losing face. This was difficult – if not impossible – given the international situation and low control of DNR/LNR. This option is now closed. The problem is Putin will find it easier to escalate than Washington, so there will be more difficult choices for the latter in the near future.

Although provision of Soviet weaponry is the most logical way to go, there are two interesting aspects that the report did not touch. First, these weapons will likely be replaced, meaning that East/Central European NATO members would get modern Western weapons instead. This is very compatible with recent pronouncements by the administration and perhaps one of the reasons why the proposal about military assistance was accepted.

Second, the effectiveness of that assistance will primarily depend on Kyiv’s ability to use it. Unfortunately, the government is pretty dysfunctional, both in the way it fights the war and especially in the way it conducts economic and political reforms. In fact, it seems to me that war has been primarily used to fight for influence inside Kyiv instead of for any other purposes. Moreover, I am shocked at how the strongest tool of consolidating the country around the government and pushing through necessary reforms – the external threat – has been largely wasted. The apparent failure of the ongoing mobilization indicates that the public is not supportive – perhaps not of war, but of the government definitely. Arms cannot win a war – it takes an army, high command, and government to do that.

The domestic politics part has been missing from the earlier debate, but in my mind this is the most important piece of the picture. One could expect confusion and inefficiency in the first few months, but not that late into the war.

Stanislav Tkachenko, St. Petersburg State University (St. Petersburg):

Washington should not take the advice to provide military assistance. It will never be implemented in its original form. If a “yes” decision is made, Russia will immediately respond to it by providing even more weapons and "volunteers" to the separatists in the Donbas. The whole of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions could very well be under the control of the separatists even before the first delivery of U.S. armaments. A “yes” decision by the U.S. will open a new stage in Ukraine’s civil war, effectively transforming it into a proxy war between the United States and Russia. It will move the whole world one-step closer to nuclear war between Washington and Moscow. It is obvious that key European allies are opposed to the decision. It will be a huge mistake for the White House to accept advice that has negative short- and long-term consequences!

Cory Welt, George Washington University (Washington, DC):

A decision to supply military assistance to Ukraine – and what kind – will ultimately be a political one. Whatever the decision, it should not be defended on the basis that the assistance will enable Ukraine to hold its current line of defense and persuade Russia to refrain from further escalation. We simply do not know how Russia will respond, although I suspect an initial escalation is more likely than not. Before providing even non-lethal military equipment, therefore, the U.S. ought to have a plan in place for how it will respond to another round of escalation – and a plan that does not involve a constant ratcheting up of military assistance. The U.S. should also be prepared for the contingency by which Ukraine remains outgunned despite an influx of military assistance and is forced to negotiate a peace on less favorable terms than those that hold now. Without such planning, it may be preferable to first strive to maintain the current line of defense through other means than military assistance.

Related Topics
  • Dubovyk
  • Kudelia
  • Marten
  • Minasyan
  • Shevel
  • Sokov
  • Tkachenko
  • U.S.-Russian Relations
  • Ukraine
  • Welt
Previous Article
  • Commentary | Комментарии

New Policy Memo: What Should Students Know about Russia’s Enemies? Conspiracy Theories in Russian Geopolitical Textbooks

  • February 6, 2015
  • Serghei Golunov
View
Next Article
  • In the News | Hовости

(Times) Мирные инициативы Запада по Украине вряд ли сработают

  • February 6, 2015
  • Kimberly Marten
View
You May Also Like
View
  • Commentary | Комментарии
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

The Desire to Possess: Russia’s War for Territory

  • Irina Busygina
  • February 8, 2023
View
  • Commentary | Комментарии
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

Kyiv-Washington Relations in Times of Colossal War: The Ultimate Test of a Strategic Partnership

  • Volodymyr Dubovyk
  • January 11, 2023
View
  • Commentary | Комментарии
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

Prevailing Soviet Legacies

  • Irina Busygina and Mikhail Filippov
  • December 27, 2022
View
  • Commentary | Комментарии
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

In Russia’s Nuclear Messaging to West and Ukraine, Putin Plays Both Bad and Good Cop

  • Simon Saradzhyan
  • December 23, 2022
View
  • Commentary | Комментарии
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

Ukraine’s Asymmetric Responses to the Russian Invasion

  • Nurlan Aliyev
  • July 28, 2022
View
  • Commentary | Комментарии
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем
  • Territorial Conflict

Dominating Ukraine’s Sky

  • Volodymyr Dubovyk
  • March 5, 2022
View
  • Commentary | Комментарии
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

Russian Anti-War Protests and the State’s Response

  • Lauren McCarthy
  • March 4, 2022
View
  • Commentary | Комментарии

Путин и Лукашенко

  • Konstantin Sonin
  • August 29, 2020

Leave a Reply Cancel reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

PONARS Eurasia
  • About
  • Membership
  • Policy Memos
  • Recommended
  • Events
Powered by narva.io

Permissions & Citation Guidelines

Input your search keywords and press Enter.