PONARS Eurasia
  • About
    • Contact
    • Membership
      • All Members
      • Core Members
      • Collegium Members
      • Associate Members
      • About Membership
    • Ukraine Experts
    • Executive Committee
  • Policy Memos
    • List of Policy Memos
    • Submissions
  • Podcasts
  • Online Academy
  • Events
    • Past Events
  • Recommended
  • Ukraine Experts
Contacts

Address
1957 E St NW,
Washington, DC 20052

adminponars@gwu.edu
202.994.5915

NEWSLETTER
Facebook
Twitter
YouTube
Podcast
PONARS Eurasia
PONARS Eurasia
  • About
    • Contact
    • Membership
      • All Members
      • Core Members
      • Collegium Members
      • Associate Members
      • About Membership
    • Ukraine Experts
    • Executive Committee
  • Policy Memos
    • List of Policy Memos
    • Submissions
  • Podcasts
  • Online Academy
  • Events
    • Past Events
  • Recommended
  • Ukraine Experts
DIGITAL RESOURCES
digital resources

Bookstore 📚

Knowledge Hub

Course Syllabi

Point & Counterpoint

Policy Perspectives

RECOMMENDED
  • A Rock and a Hard Place: The Russian Opposition in a Time of War | New Voices on Eurasia with Jeremy Ladd (April 11)

    View
  • The Russia Program at GW (IERES)

    View
  • The Evolving Concerns of Russians after the Invasion | New Voices on Eurasia with Sasha de Vogel (March 9)

    View
  • PONARS Eurasia Spring Policy Conference (March 3)

    View
  • Ukrainathon 2023 (Feb. 24-25)

    View
RSS PONARS Eurasia Podcast
  • The Putin-Xi Summit: What's New In Their Joint Communique ? February 23, 2022
    In this week’s PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman speaks with Russian China experts Vita Spivak and Alexander Gabuev about the February meeting between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, and what it may tell us about where the Russian-Chinese relationship is headed.
  • Exploring the Russian Courts' Ruling to Liquidate the Memorial Society January 28, 2022
    In this week’s PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with scholars Kelly Smith and Benjamin Nathans about the history, achievements, and impending shutdown of the Memorial Society, Russia's oldest and most venerable civic organization, and what its imminent liquidation portends for the Russian civil society.
  • Russia's 2021 census and the Kremlin's nationalities policy [Lipman Series 2021] December 9, 2021
    In this week’s PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with social scientist Andrey Shcherbak about the quality of the data collected in the recent population census and the goals of Vladimir Putin's government's nationalities policy
  • Active citizens of any kind are under threat [Lipman Series 2021] November 5, 2021
    In this week’s PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with Alexander Verkhovsky about the Kremlin's ever expanding toolkit against political and civic activists, journalists, and other dissidents.
  • Russia's Legislative Elections followup [Lipman Series 2021] October 4, 2021
    In this week’s PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with Tanya Lokot and Nikolay Petrov about the results of Russia’s legislative elections and about what comes next.
  • Why Is the Kremlin Nervous? [Lipman Series 2021] September 14, 2021
    In this week’s PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with Ben Noble and Nikolay Petrov about Russia’s September 17-19 legislative elections, repressive measures against electoral challengers, and whether to expect anything other than preordained results.
  • Vaccine Hesitancy in Russia, France, and the United States [Lipman Series 2021] August 31, 2021
    In this week's PONARS Eurasia Podcast episode, Maria Lipman chats with Denis Volkov, Naira Davlashyan, and Peter Slevin about why COVID-19 vaccination rates are still so low across the globe, comparing vaccine hesitant constituencies across Russia, France, and the United States.  
  • Is Russia Becoming More Soviet? [Lipman Series 2021] July 26, 2021
      In a new PONARS Eurasia Podcast episode, Maria Lipman chats with Maxim Trudolyubov about the current tightening of the Russian political sphere, asking whether or not it’s helpful to draw comparisons to the late Soviet period.
  • The Evolution of Russia's Political Regime [Lipman Series 2021] June 21, 2021
    In this week's episode of the PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with Grigory Golosov and Henry Hale about the evolution of Russia's political regime, and what to expect in the lead-up to September's Duma elections.
  • Volodymyr Zelensky: Year Two [Lipman Series 2021] May 24, 2021
    In this week's episode of the PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with Sergiy Kudelia and Georgiy Kasianov about Ukrainian President Zelensky's second year in office, and how he has handled the political turbulence of the past year.
  • Commentary | Комментарии

Ukraine’s Perfect Storm: How Far Will It Go?

  • December 2, 2013
  • Sergiy Kudelia

Over the first winter weekend, youth-led rallies across Ukraine, protesting the government’s decision to suspend the signing of an Association Agreement (AA) with the EU, have turned into a genuine revolutionary movement aimed at ousting the country’s president, Viktor Yanukovych.

The immediate trigger for the current large-scale popular mobilization in the Ukrainian capital was the violent dispersal of several hundred mostly young protesters remaining on Kyiv’s Independence Square (Maidan) for an overnight rally. The videos of brutal beatings of peaceful protesters went viral on social media sites and were widely broadcast on Ukrainian television.

In response, hundreds of thousands of protesters took over Maidan and adjacent streets pushing the law enforcement units out of the way. The opposition leaders called for the resignation of the government and the president and pledged to block access to government buildings until the authorities agreed to their demands. While this new popular mobilization produced immediate comparisons with the Orange Revolution, several crucial and potentially consequential differences are already clear.

First, the Orange Revolution followed a long-term mobilization campaign planned and organized by the campaign managers of Viktor Yushchenko. It also had a clear aim – the recognition of Yushchenko’s election victory. In contrast, Ukraine’s “European Revolution” started as a more spontaneous reaction to a series of government actions with little preliminary planning and quickly changing goals. Once their preliminary demands to sign the AA during the Vilnius Summit were not fulfilled, the opposition leaders were ready to acquiesce and prepare for long-term low-level protest activity until the 2015 presidential election. However, the use of force by the riot police revolutionized the demands on the streets, pushing the opposition to take a more radical stance. Early presidential and parliamentary elections organized by a temporary coalition government have now become the opposition’s key goal.

Secondly, political leaders played a central role throughout the Orange Revolution, while Yushchenko’s personal authority helped to ensure that all protest actions remained non-violent. By contrast, today’s grass-roots revolutionary movement in Kyiv has been openly suspect of political parties and often treats them as potential collaborators of the ruling elite. As a result, mass rallies yesterday, on Sunday, December 1, culminated in violent clashes with riot police near the Presidential Administration compound as numerous protesters ignored the calls of opposition MPs to stop their attacks.

Similar to the “negative coalition” during the Orange Revolution, the current movement is diverse politically with both extreme nationalists and leftists protesting side by side. However, due to the lack of authoritative unifying figures leading the movement, it remains highly fractured and decentralized with small groups often acting on their own. The festive Orange Revolution-like atmosphere of the first days of protests was replaced with genuine anger and animosity towards law-enforcement and the country’s leadership. This opens up the potential for further escalation of violence in the coming days.

Thirdly, the success of the Orange Revolution was partially due to a clear legal mechanism that opposition leaders used in order to achieve their goals. The Supreme Court’s decision opened the way for the third election round and allowed a peaceful and legitimate resolution of the standoff on the streets. This time, the opposition expects realignment in the parliament with a dozen of pro-Yanukovych MPs potentially defecting. However, even if the opposition manages to form a new majority, it can only issue a vote of no-confidence in the current government – the president will ultimately decide whether to accept any resignations and who to appoint to the new government. The opposition-led parliamentary majority can only exercise veto power over some of the president’s decisions, like blocking the president’s nomination for prime minister.

There are few legal mechanisms to oust the president or form a compliant government unless Yanukovych suddenly decides to cooperate with the opposition. Given the opposition’s revolutionized demands, such cooperation remains unlikely and the legal way out of the crisis is still unclear. This may further intensify pressure on opposition leaders to resort to extra-judicial actions in the near future.

Fourthly, high-level elite negotiations were a crucial component allowing for a peaceful end to the Orange Revolution. These talks were possible due to international mediation and former-president Leonid Kuchma’s interest in ensuring his safe exit and maintaining his family’s business fortunes. With Yanukovych’s son accumulating over half a billion dollars in assets over the last three years, the president has a lot to lose from a revolutionary outcome. As does his key backer and the richest Ukrainian, Rinat Akhmetov, whose fortune tripled during Yanukovych’s presidency to over fifteen billion dollars.

However, Yanukovych still has sixteen months of his tenure left and he can draw on the support in his core electoral regions in eastern and southern Ukraine to claim his continued legitimacy as president. Protests also do not represent a personal threat to Yanukovych at the moment given the continued loyalty of the law enforcement.

So, if the talks do take place in the near future, Yanukovych is unlikely to accept any demands related to his immediate resignation. Anything short of this outcome, however, could now discredit opposition leaders among their own supporters. The least politically damaging compromise for the opposition could be the reinstatement of the parliamentary-presidential system with the government appointed by the opposition-led parliament determined to quickly sign the AA with the EU. Yanukovych would then remain a figurehead president committed to stepping down in 2015. However, this scenario would require a dramatic shift of power balance in favor of the opposition in the coming days in order to be seriously considered by the authorities.

Finally, the events of the last week demonstrated the risks that autocrats face when resorting to the public use of force, something that Kuchma shrewdly avoided in 2004. Sudden repressive actions are even more likely to generate major popular backlashes in the current media environment, which is saturated with live video feeds and instant news coverage.

In the 1989 revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe, the inability of leaders to instill fear and deter participation by raising the costs of protests meant a quick demise of their regimes. In Ukraine, much will depend on the consistency of opposition leaders, people’s commitment to remain on the streets, and acceptance of their demands by the so far silent majority in the eastern and southern regions. The coming week may prove decisive with Yanukovych’s scheduled visit to China creating a sense of power vacuum in the capital and raising uncertainty among the ruling elites. However, even if the authorities attempt and succeed with coercive demobilization now it will put Yanukovych’s political survival beyond 2015 in even greater doubt and make another electoral revolution against him almost inevitable.  

Related Topics
  • EU
  • Kudelia
  • Ukraine
Previous Article
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

Thirty Leading Experts on “Rebuilding the U.S.-Russia Relationship”

  • November 27, 2013
  • PONARS Eurasia
View
Next Article
  • Policy Memos | Аналитика

Russian-Belarusian Relations after Vilnius: Old Wine in New Bottles?

  • December 2, 2013
  • Arkady Moshes
View
You May Also Like
View
  • Commentary | Комментарии
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

The Desire to Possess: Russia’s War for Territory

  • Irina Busygina
  • February 8, 2023
View
  • Commentary | Комментарии
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

Kyiv-Washington Relations in Times of Colossal War: The Ultimate Test of a Strategic Partnership

  • Volodymyr Dubovyk
  • January 11, 2023
View
  • Commentary | Комментарии
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

Prevailing Soviet Legacies

  • Irina Busygina and Mikhail Filippov
  • December 27, 2022
View
  • Commentary | Комментарии
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

In Russia’s Nuclear Messaging to West and Ukraine, Putin Plays Both Bad and Good Cop

  • Simon Saradzhyan
  • December 23, 2022
View
  • Commentary | Комментарии
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

Ukraine’s Asymmetric Responses to the Russian Invasion

  • Nurlan Aliyev
  • July 28, 2022
View
  • Commentary | Комментарии
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем
  • Territorial Conflict

Dominating Ukraine’s Sky

  • Volodymyr Dubovyk
  • March 5, 2022
View
  • Commentary | Комментарии
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

Russian Anti-War Protests and the State’s Response

  • Lauren McCarthy
  • March 4, 2022
View
  • Commentary | Комментарии

Путин и Лукашенко

  • Konstantin Sonin
  • August 29, 2020

Leave a Reply Cancel reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

PONARS Eurasia
  • About
  • Membership
  • Policy Memos
  • Recommended
  • Events
Powered by narva.io

Permissions & Citation Guidelines

Input your search keywords and press Enter.