PONARS Eurasia
  • About
    • Contact
    • Membership
      • All Members
      • Core Members
      • Collegium Members
      • Associate Members
      • About Membership
    • Ukraine Experts
    • Executive Committee
  • Policy Memos
    • List of Policy Memos
    • Submissions
  • Podcasts
  • Online Academy
  • Events
    • Past Events
  • Recommended
  • Ukraine Experts
Contacts

Address
1957 E St NW,
Washington, DC 20052

adminponars@gwu.edu
202.994.5915

NEWSLETTER
Facebook
Twitter
YouTube
Podcast
PONARS Eurasia
PONARS Eurasia
  • About
    • Contact
    • Membership
      • All Members
      • Core Members
      • Collegium Members
      • Associate Members
      • About Membership
    • Ukraine Experts
    • Executive Committee
  • Policy Memos
    • List of Policy Memos
    • Submissions
  • Podcasts
  • Online Academy
  • Events
    • Past Events
  • Recommended
  • Ukraine Experts
DIGITAL RESOURCES
digital resources

Bookstore 📚

Knowledge Hub

Course Syllabi

Point & Counterpoint

Policy Perspectives

RECOMMENDED
  • The Desire to Possess: Russia’s War for Territory

    View
  • Russia at War and the Islamic World

    View
  • Ukraine’s Ripple Effect on Russia’s Indo-Pacific Horizon

    View
  • The Determinants of Assistance to Ukrainian and Syrian Refugees | New Voices on Eurasia with Volha Charnysh (Feb. 16)

    View
  • Conflicts in the North Caucasus Since 1991 | PONARS Eurasia Online Academy

    View
RSS PONARS Eurasia Podcast
  • The Putin-Xi Summit: What's New In Their Joint Communique ? February 23, 2022
    In this week’s PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman speaks with Russian China experts Vita Spivak and Alexander Gabuev about the February meeting between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, and what it may tell us about where the Russian-Chinese relationship is headed.
  • Exploring the Russian Courts' Ruling to Liquidate the Memorial Society January 28, 2022
    In this week’s PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with scholars Kelly Smith and Benjamin Nathans about the history, achievements, and impending shutdown of the Memorial Society, Russia's oldest and most venerable civic organization, and what its imminent liquidation portends for the Russian civil society.
  • Russia's 2021 census and the Kremlin's nationalities policy [Lipman Series 2021] December 9, 2021
    In this week’s PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with social scientist Andrey Shcherbak about the quality of the data collected in the recent population census and the goals of Vladimir Putin's government's nationalities policy
  • Active citizens of any kind are under threat [Lipman Series 2021] November 5, 2021
    In this week’s PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with Alexander Verkhovsky about the Kremlin's ever expanding toolkit against political and civic activists, journalists, and other dissidents.
  • Russia's Legislative Elections followup [Lipman Series 2021] October 4, 2021
    In this week’s PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with Tanya Lokot and Nikolay Petrov about the results of Russia’s legislative elections and about what comes next.
  • Why Is the Kremlin Nervous? [Lipman Series 2021] September 14, 2021
    In this week’s PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with Ben Noble and Nikolay Petrov about Russia’s September 17-19 legislative elections, repressive measures against electoral challengers, and whether to expect anything other than preordained results.
  • Vaccine Hesitancy in Russia, France, and the United States [Lipman Series 2021] August 31, 2021
    In this week's PONARS Eurasia Podcast episode, Maria Lipman chats with Denis Volkov, Naira Davlashyan, and Peter Slevin about why COVID-19 vaccination rates are still so low across the globe, comparing vaccine hesitant constituencies across Russia, France, and the United States.  
  • Is Russia Becoming More Soviet? [Lipman Series 2021] July 26, 2021
      In a new PONARS Eurasia Podcast episode, Maria Lipman chats with Maxim Trudolyubov about the current tightening of the Russian political sphere, asking whether or not it’s helpful to draw comparisons to the late Soviet period.
  • The Evolution of Russia's Political Regime [Lipman Series 2021] June 21, 2021
    In this week's episode of the PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with Grigory Golosov and Henry Hale about the evolution of Russia's political regime, and what to expect in the lead-up to September's Duma elections.
  • Volodymyr Zelensky: Year Two [Lipman Series 2021] May 24, 2021
    In this week's episode of the PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with Sergiy Kudelia and Georgiy Kasianov about Ukrainian President Zelensky's second year in office, and how he has handled the political turbulence of the past year.
  • Commentary | Комментарии

Voting on the UN Resolution for Georgia’s Territorial Integrity

  • July 16, 2013
  • Sufian Zhemukhov

Last month (June 13), the UN General Assembly adopted a Georgia-initiated resolution about the situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Similar to the previous five resolutions, this one acknowledges the territorial integrity of Georgia and the right of internally displaced persons to return to their homes.

Every year more members of the UN vote in support of the resolution, which is a positive dynamic for the Georgian position. The number of voters has increased steadily five times from 2008 through 2013 (see the table).

Voting for the UN resolution for Georgia’s territorial integrity:

Year

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Supported

14

48

50

57

60

62

Against

11

19

17

13

15

16

Neutral

105

78

86

74

82

84

The trend of increasing UN support shows that Georgian diplomats have succeeded in harnessing the attention of the international community over Russian, Abkhazian, and South Ossetian efforts.

The leading role of Georgian diplomacy can be explained by its focus on the humanitarian side of the problem rather than on the political. Maia Panjikidze, the Georgian foreign minister, stated that the UN resolution is necessary to keep attention on the issue of internally displaced persons in the region.

Annually, Georgia offers a program to resolve the problem while Russia does not (while criticizing the Georgian text). Vitalii Churkin, the Russian representative at the UN, stated in general that the Georgian resolution was politicized and the UN should invite delegates from Abkhazia and South Ossetia when discussing questions related to their status. Indeed, while Georgia and Russia have the opportunity to express their positions at the UN, the “unrecognized” republics have no representatives on the international level.

For a less reported view, I asked two leading specialists, both well known for their pro-Abkhazian advocacy, to comment on how the pro-Georgian dynamic at the UN helps the resolution of the problem of Georgian territorial integrity. What does the dynamic mean for Abkhazia and South Ossetia? 

George Hewitt (Professor, University of London):

The world's major states erred in following the United Kingdom in precipitately recognizing Georgia in the spring of 1992. At the time, a civil war was raging in the west Georgian region of Mingrelia between supporters of the ousted president (Mingrelian) Zviad Gamsakhurdia and those of the junta that had ousted him (then led by Eduard Shevardnadze); the war in South Ossetia, which Gamsakhurdia had initiated, was still being fought, and Georgia had no constitutional government. The recognition was offered solely in the mistaken belief that Gorbachev's former Foreign Minister would restore order to his rapidly disintegrating native land. Membership of the IMF, World Bank and, most importantly, the UN quickly followed before Shevardnadze could secure a legitimate mandate. And within 2 weeks of Georgia entering the UN, Shevardnadze began the assault on Abkhazia (14 August), which his forces then lost 14 months later. However, UN member-states tend to support fellow member-states. Moreover, the United States and the UK (EU states) have been doggedly unwilling to acknowledge their error in the spring of 1992 and place pressure on others to follow their lead. This pressure has been applied to those South American and Pacific states who have either recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia or who have shown some interest in doing so, and similar “persuasion” can reasonably be assumed to lie behind the annual increase in the UN vote in favor of those refugees who fled Abkhazia at the end of the Abkhazian war. The vote, while it might please the authorities in Tbilisi, has absolutely no relevance to the position on the ground.

Ergün Ozgur (Assistant Professor, Cyprus International University):

The UN General Assembly adopted the resolution on June 13 by a recorded vote of 62 in favor to 16 against with 87 abstentions. The resolution “recognized the right of return for all refugees and internally displaced persons to their homes in Georgia, including Abkhazia and South Ossetia.” The resolution was initiated by Georgia, which is on one side of the problem, while the other side, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, were not given any chance to express their views.

Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been participants of the “Geneva International Discussions” together with Georgia, Russia, and the United States, with the mediation of the EU, UN, and OSCE, since 2008. Particular UN member countries that take part in the Geneva discussions should know that “durable peace, a commitment to confidence-building measures, and immediate steps to ensure respect for human rights and favorable security conditions for return of internally displaced persons” can be possible if the “non-use of force” agreement is signed by Georgia and all parties decide on how the humanitarian issues are to be solved. If the “non-use of force” agreement is not signed by the Georgian side, there may be the possibility of another conflict taking place, like the one we saw between Georgia and South Ossetia in 2008.

Moreover, adopting the resolution initiated by Georgia will satisfy one party to the conflict but will not generate any peace in the region and will not solve the problem. If there is the possibility to use force against Abkhazia or South Ossetia, how can the adoption of this resolution by UN member countries protect the people in the area? In terms of the return of displaced persons, the Georgian side, instead of insisting on their return, should listen to the ideas of the other sides and try to find a “win-win solution” for the problem. UN members can also contribute to the situation while taking into consideration the opinions of all sides involved in the situation.

The UN members that voted for this resolution take Georgia’s side in the long-lasting conflict by supporting the territorial integrity of Georgia and they try to put pressure on the newly recognized and war-damaged territories, which suffered heavy sanctions for more than a decade (Abkhazia in 1992-1993 and South Ossetia in 1991 and 2008).

Instead of adopting such a resolution, which does not consist of Abkhaz or South Ossetian perspectives, those 62 UN member countries should try to listen to all sides of the conflict and try to help them find a “win-win solution” to the problem, which "can occur if the “non-use of force” agreement between Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Georgia is signed, which would then serve as a good basis for future negotiations on political and humanitarian issues.

Sufian Zhemukhov is a visiting fellow at the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (IERES), George Washington University, blogging for PONARS Eurasia on the Caucasus.

Related Topics
  • Abkhazia
  • Georgia
  • South Ossetia
  • Zhemukhov
Previous Article
  • Commentary | Комментарии

Kazan’s Massive Sports Universiade: Russia’s Rehearsal

  • July 16, 2013
  • Andrey Makarychev
View
Next Article
  • In the News | Hовости

“Кое-кому во власти выгодно показать телекартинку, где на милиционера кто-то нападает”

  • July 16, 2013
  • Olexiy Haran
View
You May Also Like
View
  • Commentary | Комментарии
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

The Desire to Possess: Russia’s War for Territory

  • Irina Busygina
  • February 8, 2023
View
  • Commentary | Комментарии
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

Kyiv-Washington Relations in Times of Colossal War: The Ultimate Test of a Strategic Partnership

  • Volodymyr Dubovyk
  • January 11, 2023
View
  • Commentary | Комментарии
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

Prevailing Soviet Legacies

  • Irina Busygina and Mikhail Filippov
  • December 27, 2022
View
  • Commentary | Комментарии
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

In Russia’s Nuclear Messaging to West and Ukraine, Putin Plays Both Bad and Good Cop

  • Simon Saradzhyan
  • December 23, 2022
View
  • Commentary | Комментарии
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

Ukraine’s Asymmetric Responses to the Russian Invasion

  • Nurlan Aliyev
  • July 28, 2022
View
  • Commentary | Комментарии
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем
  • Territorial Conflict

Dominating Ukraine’s Sky

  • Volodymyr Dubovyk
  • March 5, 2022
View
  • Commentary | Комментарии
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

Russian Anti-War Protests and the State’s Response

  • Lauren McCarthy
  • March 4, 2022
View
  • Commentary | Комментарии

Путин и Лукашенко

  • Konstantin Sonin
  • August 29, 2020

Leave a Reply Cancel reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

PONARS Eurasia
  • About
  • Membership
  • Policy Memos
  • Recommended
  • Events
Powered by narva.io

Permissions & Citation Guidelines

Input your search keywords and press Enter.