PONARS Eurasia
  • About
    • Contact
    • List of Members
    • Ukraine Experts
    • About Membership
    • Executive Committee
  • Policy Memos
    • List of Policy Memos
    • Submissions
  • Podcast
  • Online Academy
  • Events
    • Past Events
  • Recommended
  • Ukraine Experts
Contacts

Address
1957 E St NW,
Washington, DC 20052

adminponars@gwu.edu
202.994.5915

NEWSLETTER
Facebook
Twitter
YouTube
Podcast
PONARS Eurasia
PONARS Eurasia
  • About
    • Contact
    • List of Members
    • Ukraine Experts
    • About Membership
    • Executive Committee
  • Policy Memos
    • List of Policy Memos
    • Submissions
  • Podcast
  • Online Academy
  • Events
    • Past Events
  • Recommended
  • Ukraine Experts
DIGITAL RESOURCES
digital resources

Bookstore 📚

Knowledge Hub

Course Syllabi

Point & Counterpoint

Policy Perspectives

RECOMMENDED
  • Illiberalism and Public Opinion Junctures in Russia’s War on Ukraine

    View
  • Policy Exchange Discussion & Memos: Guaranteeing Ukraine’s Long-Run Security (June 9)

    View
  • Ukraine’s Best Chance for Peace

    View
  • We want the war to end. But should calls for negotiating with Putin be taken seriously?

    View
  • Policy Briefs | BEAR Network-PONARS Eurasia Conference

    View
RSS PONARS Eurasia Podcast
  • The Putin-Xi Summit: What's New In Their Joint Communique ? February 23, 2022
    In this week’s PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman speaks with Russian China experts Vita Spivak and Alexander Gabuev about the February meeting between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, and what it may tell us about where the Russian-Chinese relationship is headed.
  • Exploring the Russian Courts' Ruling to Liquidate the Memorial Society January 28, 2022
    In this week’s PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with scholars Kelly Smith and Benjamin Nathans about the history, achievements, and impending shutdown of the Memorial Society, Russia's oldest and most venerable civic organization, and what its imminent liquidation portends for the Russian civil society.
  • Russia's 2021 census and the Kremlin's nationalities policy [Lipman Series 2021] December 9, 2021
    In this week’s PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with social scientist Andrey Shcherbak about the quality of the data collected in the recent population census and the goals of Vladimir Putin's government's nationalities policy
  • Active citizens of any kind are under threat [Lipman Series 2021] November 5, 2021
    In this week’s PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with Alexander Verkhovsky about the Kremlin's ever expanding toolkit against political and civic activists, journalists, and other dissidents.
  • Russia's Legislative Elections followup [Lipman Series 2021] October 4, 2021
    In this week’s PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with Tanya Lokot and Nikolay Petrov about the results of Russia’s legislative elections and about what comes next.
  • Why Is the Kremlin Nervous? [Lipman Series 2021] September 14, 2021
    In this week’s PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with Ben Noble and Nikolay Petrov about Russia’s September 17-19 legislative elections, repressive measures against electoral challengers, and whether to expect anything other than preordained results.
  • Vaccine Hesitancy in Russia, France, and the United States [Lipman Series 2021] August 31, 2021
    In this week's PONARS Eurasia Podcast episode, Maria Lipman chats with Denis Volkov, Naira Davlashyan, and Peter Slevin about why COVID-19 vaccination rates are still so low across the globe, comparing vaccine hesitant constituencies across Russia, France, and the United States.  
  • Is Russia Becoming More Soviet? [Lipman Series 2021] July 26, 2021
      In a new PONARS Eurasia Podcast episode, Maria Lipman chats with Maxim Trudolyubov about the current tightening of the Russian political sphere, asking whether or not it’s helpful to draw comparisons to the late Soviet period.
  • The Evolution of Russia's Political Regime [Lipman Series 2021] June 21, 2021
    In this week's episode of the PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with Grigory Golosov and Henry Hale about the evolution of Russia's political regime, and what to expect in the lead-up to September's Duma elections.
  • Volodymyr Zelensky: Year Two [Lipman Series 2021] May 24, 2021
    In this week's episode of the PONARS Eurasia Podcast, Maria Lipman chats with Sergiy Kudelia and Georgiy Kasianov about Ukrainian President Zelensky's second year in office, and how he has handled the political turbulence of the past year.
  • Commentary | Комментарии

Expected and Unexpected Revelations of the New Ukrainian Parliament

  • November 4, 2014
  • Yuriy Matsiyevsky

Last week’s parliamentary elections in Ukraine had two major goals, one public and one private. Publicly, the elections sought to renew the legislature from the remnants of the Yanukovych era, releasing the country from the stain of the infamous "dictatorship laws" of January 16, 2014. Privately, President Poroshenko sought to obtain a political majority in the parliament so that he could form a “president’s government.”

One worry was that if these two pillars of authoritarian power were rebuilt, the president could, allegedly, seek the restoration of the 1996 constitution, which would grant him the same powers that Kuchma and Yanukovych once had.[1] As Henry E. Hale pointed out in his PONARS Eurasia comment on these elections: the concentration of power in the hands of directly-elected presidents poses “one of the greatest challenges to democracy in the post-Soviet context.” However, the results of these elections show that both goals were hardly achieved.

Poroshenko lost roughly 50% in support since the May presidential elections (reflected in his block’s proportional performance: 54% in May to 21% in October). This “defeat” prevents Poroshenko from being the key player in coalition forming. (Ukrainians, as many analysts have noted, seem to prefer divided rather than concentrated executive powers).

We also see from the results that a genuine rebirth of the parliament is dubious. Though the parliament did become “renewed” by 56%, which is probably the largest share of new faces since the country’s independence, 64 former MPs (who had all voted for the January “dictatorship laws”) made it back in, mostly through single-member districts. Another 37 MPs who had at one time or another been under investigation for corruption by journalists are also back in the parliament.[2] Most of these members will likely be seated in the faction of the former Party of Regions that is now called the “The Opposition Bloc.”

The former parliament had numerous “family clans” consisting of relatives and “clients” of large business groups, with the most pervasive network being the “Yanukovych’s clan.”[3] At least 55 former MPs (12% of the parliament) had relatives either in the parliament or in state executive positions. The new parliament can hardly be said to be a clean sweep of nepotism and patronal ties. It is already known that Poroshenko’s older son, Oleksiy, will have a parliament seat, as will Iryna Lutsenko, wife of Yiriy Lutsenko, a leader of the “Poroshenko bloc,” and that Victor Baloha ("Transcarpathian clan”) will have two relatives in parliament.  

A negative outlook on reforms and survival

Implementing reforms may prove to be difficult for the new Ukrainian parliament. There is a growing consent among Ukrainian political experts that it is doomed to be short lived. From the outset, a real renewal of the parliament was held back by the “mixed” electoral system.

Even though the rightists and the leftists (“populists”) did not get seats, there are still two irreconcilable groups represented: the radical reformists (composed of civic activists, military commanders, and journalists) and the radical anti-reformists (represented by former members of the Party of Regions and by a sizable number of independents).

Thus, the main cleavage in the Rada will not be between pro-Western and pro-Russian forces, but between a relatively small group of pro-reform and a much larger group of anti-reform deputies. Interestingly, the biggest share of anti-reformers will not be found in the faction of the former regionaries, but in the two largest pro-Western factions of Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk.  The simple reason for this is their unwillingness (self-styled “inability”) to change electoral laws. Retaining the mixed electoral system with the closed party lists was a cost paid to the major stake holders (oligarchs and their representatives in the former parliament) for their consent to hold early elections.

Indeed, the system’s closed party lists and single-member districts proved to have a traumatic effect on the real renewal of the legislature. The rent-seeking oligarchs (and their representatives in the new parliament) are not interested in reforms. Many such aspects hamper the needed, total reset of the country.

What can we realistically expect from this parliament?     

Even though the “old political machines” prevented the formation of a truly new, broad, grass-roots, civic moment taking shape in the parliament, the “Samopomich” (“Self-reliance”) bloc made great headway. It finished third with 11% (32 seats).

Quantitatively, even though the new parliament has more new MPs than old ones, the newcomers will be scattered among at least three factions, between the Poroshenko, Yatseniuk, and Samopomich blocs, which most probably will form a coalition.

The newcomers will face at least two major challenges. First, being scattered among several factions they will be put under “pressure verticals” of their faction leaders who will demand conformity with internal rules. Any initiatives coming “from below” could be blocked by the skillful faction leaders. Second, the newcomers will have difficulty in establishing cooperation networks “horizontally” across factions. If they can overcome these ­challenges, the parliament will have a chance to implement reforms (and thus survive).

Creating horizontal, cooperative networks among MPs is especially important. Unfortunately, Ukrainian MPS have had a real deficit doing this in the past. But if there is a recommendation for the policy community as the new parliament gets its footing, they should strongly help promote cross-factional cooperation.


[1] Yulia Mostova, chief editor of the leading Ukrainian weekly “Dzerkalo Tyzhnya,” mentioned that some Constitutional Court judges signaled her editorial office on moves attempted by authorized representatives of the president regarding the possibility of cancelling the acting Constitution (of 2004) and the restoration of the Constitution of 1996.  See, “Prolitayuchy nad hnizdom feniksa,” Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, September 26, 2014, http://gazeta.dt.ua/internal/prolitayuchi-nad-gnizdom-feniksa-_.html

[2] See the preliminary analysis of the new parliament’s composition made by the civil movement “Chesno” (“Honestly”), http://chesno.org/en/news/2035/

[3] Sergei Golovnev, “7 semei Verchovnoi  Rady”, Forbes Ukraine, http://forbes.ua/nation/1341156-7-semej-verhovnoj-rady/1341158#cut

————-

Also see:

Oleksandr Sushko's Oct. 30 comment: Parliamentary Elections: A New Ukrainian Chance for Change

Volodymyr Dubovyk’s Oct. 28 comment: An Overview of the Make-up of the New Ukrainian Parliament

Henry E. Hale’s Oct. 26 comment: Ukraine's Election: Hope and Concern

 

 

Yuriy Matsiyevsky
Yuriy Matsiyevsky
Website | + posts
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science
Affiliation

Ostroh Academy National University, Ukraine
Links

Ostroh Academy National University (Bio)
Expertise

Ukraine, Democratization, Institutions, Informal Politics
  • Yuriy Matsiyevsky
    https://www.ponarseurasia.org/author/yuriy-matsiyevsky/
    Why Authoritarianism Has Weak Chances in Ukraine
Related Topics
  • Matsiyevsky
  • Ukraine
Previous Article
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

Policy Memo: Pro et Contra: Views of the United States in Four Post-Soviet States

  • November 3, 2014
  • PONARS Eurasia
View
Next Article
  • In the News | Hовости

Донбасс упустил особый статус

  • November 4, 2014
  • Olexiy Haran
View
You May Also Like
View
  • Commentary | Комментарии
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем
  • Territorial Conflict

Dominating Ukraine’s Sky

  • Volodymyr Dubovyk
  • March 5, 2022
View
  • Commentary | Комментарии
  • Recommended | Рекомендуем

Russian Anti-War Protests and the State’s Response

  • Lauren McCarthy
  • March 4, 2022
View
  • Commentary | Комментарии

Путин и Лукашенко

  • Konstantin Sonin
  • August 29, 2020
View
  • Commentary | Комментарии

Отравление оппозиционеров в России превратилось в регулярную практику

  • Vladimir Gelman
  • August 22, 2020
View
  • Commentary | Комментарии

Авторитарные режимы не вечны: О ситуации в Белоруссии

  • Vladimir Gelman
  • August 14, 2020
View
  • Commentary | Комментарии

В Беларуси пока что все идет по российскому сценарию

  • Olexiy Haran
  • August 12, 2020
View
  • Commentary | Комментарии

Опасная игра Лукашенко

  • Pavel Baev
  • August 11, 2020
View
  • Commentary | Комментарии

Власть справилась

  • Sergei Medvedev
  • August 10, 2020

Leave a Reply Cancel reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

PONARS Eurasia
  • About
  • Membership
  • Policy Memos
  • Recommended
  • Events
Powered by narva.io

Permissions & Citation Guidelines

Input your search keywords and press Enter.