Policy Memos | Аналитические записки

Policy Memo # 466
Sergey Minasyan 24 Mar 2017
(PONARS Policy Memo) Over the last two decades, conventional (non-nuclear) deterrence in Russia’s military strategy has changed from being a sub-tactical, sub-strategic warfighting tool to being a separate military-political factor—a self-contained component in Russia’s strategic deterrence concept. Soon after Russia revised its military doctrine in 2014, it applied this conventional deterrence concept in its Syria campaign—...
Policy Memo # 465
Sergey Markedonov 22 Mar 2017
(PONARS Policy Memo) Although the South Caucasus has been overshadowed by events in the Middle East and Ukraine, the region continues to be strategically important, especially for Russia and the EU. The ethno-political conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabagh (NK), as well as the spread of Islamist views, have direct bearing on Russia’s internal security.[1] The EU has been seeking to diversify energy supplies by promoting...
Policy Memo # 464
Elizabeth Wishnick 16 Mar 2017
(PONARS Policy Memo) In a 1987 speech in Murmansk, Mikhail Gorbachev famously called for the Arctic to become a “zone of peace.” Since the end of the Cold War, Arctic states largely succeeded in insulating the Far North from tensions in great power relations. However, the crisis between Russia and the West since the onset of the conflict in Ukraine in 2014 threatens to disturb the Arctic peace at a time when cooperation is all the more...
Policy Memo # 463
Kornely Kakachia 10 Mar 2017
(PONARS Policy Memo) For Georgia, the enacting of an Association Agreement with the EU in the summer of 2016 was a pivotal moment in cementing its strategic bonds with Europe. The agreement, which lowers trade barriers and promotes democratic reforms, undeniably marks an important course for Georgia’s foreign and security policies. However, even as officials in Tbilisi talk about the irreversible nature of Georgia’s Europeanization,...
Policy Memo # 462
Volodymyr Kulyk 07 Mar 2017
(PONARS Policy Memo) Among the many challenges faced by the Ukrainian government after the victory of the Euromaidan, two issues have the highest potential for dividing society and thus weakening the country in its ongoing confrontation with Russia: memory and language. In these two domains, the government has had to reconcile the active minority’s call for a radical break with imperial legacies and the majority’s call to preserve the...
Policy Memo # 461
Anar Valiyev 24 Feb 2017
(PONARS Policy Memo) The unexpected results of last summer’s UK Brexit referendum significantly impacted the perception of Azerbaijanis about their country’s future cooperation with the EU. Britain is a major investor in Azerbaijan and has played the role of Baku’s EU champion. London has been the preeminent defender of Baku initiatives from within the EU, among other things advocating for the Baku-Ceyhan gas pipeline to Turkey and...
Policy Memo # 460
Samuel Greene 22 Feb 2017
(PONARS Policy Memo) Within the next 24 months, the international sanctions imposed on Russia after the annexation of Crimea and the instigation of conflict in the Donbas will likely weaken—despite the near certainty that neither Moscow’s policies toward Ukraine nor its domestic politics will have significantly improved in Europe’s view. The ascent of Donald Trump in the United States, the emergence of “Brexit,” the...
Policy Memo # 459
Volodymyr Dubovyk 16 Feb 2017
(PONARS Policy Memo) To ask whether Ukraine is a client state of the United States might seem provocative. In the opinion of some, being a “client state” is negative, implying that the state is no longer free, particularly in the international arena—akin to being a colony. This negative connotation resonates with the message coming from the Kremlin (and Russian propaganda) that Washington is somehow in control of Ukraine, dictating...
Policy Memo # 458
Olexiy Haran, Mariia Zolkina 16 Feb 2017
(PONARS Policy Memo) Before 2014, the majority of Ukrainians did not view the goal of European integration as a “national idea.” Even so, most Ukrainians had positive views about developing relations with and integrating into the EU. And even though former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych refused to accept the idea of joining NATO, he officially maintained EU integration as a priority. In fact, the Yanukovych administration helped...
Policy Memo # 457
Polina Sinovets 16 Feb 2017
(PONARS Policy Memo) The official inauguration of a European missile defense (MD) site in Romania in the spring of 2016 triggered a new wave of anti-Western rhetoric in Russia. President Vladimir Putin declared that the system being deployed in Romania and Poland was not defensive, but part of the U.S. strategic nuclear capability. Therefore, he said in May 2016, Moscow “will be forced to think about neutralizing the...


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